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ABSTRACT 
 Social media screening of homeland security job applicants may infringe on their 
free-speech rights, which diminishes homeland security agencies as defenders of the law 
and hampers their recruitment efforts. When homeland security employers screen the 
social media of job applicants, what are the free-speech rights of those applicants, and do 
existing social-media screening policies support or undermine applicants’ free-speech 
rights? Content analysis of existing case law reveals no established precedent for the 
free-speech rights of government job applicants. Legal and social science analysis 
indicates applicants should enjoy the full First Amendment protections of private citizens 
and not be subject to the same limitations placed on public employees. Publicly available 
social media screening policies have elements that may chill free speech by encouraging 
applicants to self-restrict social media activity. Homeland security agencies should be 
aware that social media screening may impair the free-speech rights of job applicants, 
notify applicants when they will screen social media profiles, provide clear guidance on 
what speech is considered disqualifying, and avoid suggesting that social media screening 
is used to perpetuate the existing agency culture. 
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Homeland security employers (e.g., police departments, fire departments, and 
federal agencies) that engage in social media screening (SMS) of their job applicants 
should be aware of the risk of infringing on the applicants’ free-speech rights and take steps 
to mitigate that risk. The law on free-speech protections for homeland security job 
applicants is not established though the need for it is becoming increasingly important, as 
social media provides an expansive and permanently documented platform for examining 
individual speech. Without clear jurisprudence, homeland security employers may 
inadvertently pressure applicants to self-restrict their speech. 
Increasingly, homeland security background investigations include applicants’ 
social media history, whereby employers look for inflammatory statements or behavior 
indicating the potential for future misbehavior. As of 2016, Career Builder reported that 60 
percent of employers engage in SMS, and the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
reported that 58 percent of police departments use SMS.1 Homeland security employers, 
particularly, must screen unfit applicants due to the sensitive nature of their operations and 
the public-facing nature of their employees.2 However, homeland security employers 
should also consider the possible costs of SMS, including infringing on the free-speech 
rights of job applicants. 
The infringement of the free-speech rights of homeland security job applicants is 
not a theoretical problem and has practical implications for homeland security employers. 
First, homeland security employers should serve as leaders in protecting all rights including 
free speech. Many homeland security employers recognize this responsibility. For 
                                                 
1 Lauren Salm, “70 Percent of Employers Are Snooping Candidates’ Social Media Profiles,” Career 
Builder, June 15, 2017, https://www.careerbuilder.com/advice/social-media-survey-2017; and International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, “Social Media Survey” (Alexandria, VA: Center for Social Media, 2010), 
http://www.iacpsocialmedia.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Survey-Results-Document.pdf. 
2 David Bradford, “Police Officer Candidate Background Investigation: Law Enforcement 
Management’s Most Effective Tool for Employing the Most Qualified Candidate,” Public Personnel 
Management 27, no. 4 (December 1998): 423, https://doi.org/10.1177/009102609802700401; and Matthew 




example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s mission statement includes the obligation 
to “protect civil rights” and its core value of “rigorous obedience to the Constitution of the 
United States.”3 If homeland security employers disregard the risk that SMS diminishes 
civil rights, they are hampering their mission while attempting to achieve it.  
Second, SMS can hinder recruitment and diversification efforts by homeland 
security employers. Police departments are already facing a recruitment challenge, as 
documented in RAND’s 2010 report Police Recruitment and Retention for the New 
Millennium, which documents the inflow and outflow dynamics that challenge departments 
in fully staffing their ranks.4 In the context of this recruiting challenge, SMS of applicants 
may dissuade some individuals from applying for homeland security jobs. For example, 
the local media in Cleveland reports, “Many blacks cite stigma and cop culture [and] avoid 
police recruiters.”5 If candidates have posted to a Black Lives Matter group or “liked” such 
a group on Facebook, they may doubt their ability to be hired by a police agency. Homeland 
security employers should take this possibility seriously and work to protect applicants’ 
free-speech rights to encourage recruitment efforts.  
To evaluate whether SMS harms the free-speech rights of homeland security job 
applicants, this thesis considers two research questions: When homeland security 
employers screen the social media of job applicants, what are the free-speech rights of 
those applicants, and do publicly available social-media screening policies of homeland 
security employers support or undermine applicants’ free-speech rights?  
To answer these research questions, this thesis proceeds in five steps. First, it 
provides background on the constitutional right to free speech, with a focus on the rights 
of government employees. The First Amendment provides for the right to speak freely 
                                                 
3 “Mission & Priorities,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed December 3, 2018, https://www. 
fbi.gov/about/mission. 
4 Jeremy M. Wilson et al., Police Recruitment and Retention for the New Millennium (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2010), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG959.pdf. 
5 Phil Trexler and Tom Meyer, “Many Blacks Cite Stigma and Cop Culture, Avoid Police Recruiters,” 
WKYC, May 9, 2018, https://www.wkyc.com/article/news/investigations/many-blacks-cite-stigma-and-
cop-culture-avoid-police-recruiters/95-550249949.  
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without government interference.6 Case law affirms that private citizens have the broadest 
protections for speech.7 However, courts have approved limitations on public employees, 
whose speech is protected only when the employee speaks “as a private citizen” about “a 
matter of public concern,” and the speaker’s interest in exercising their right to free speech 
is greater than the interest of the public employer in effective operations.8 Courts have 
continued to use this jurisprudence in the internet age, applying it to disputes around 
Facebook likes and social media policies.9 
Second, this thesis presents a content analysis of existing case law to confirm there 
is no established precedent for the free-speech rights of government job applicants. In 
content analysis, the researcher analyzes a body of human communications for patterns to 
answer a research question.10 Here, the LexisNexis database—which includes over 180 
million federal and state court cases—served as the body of communications. After sorting 
for those cases most likely to establish a rule on the free-speech rights of government job 
applicants, 192 cases were reviewed. The vast majority of those cases were unrelated to 
free-speech rights of job applicants. The few that were related were distinguishable and did 
not specifically establish the free-speech rights of public job applicants. 
Third, this thesis evaluates legal arguments and concludes that applicants should 
enjoy the full First Amendment protections of private citizens and not be subject to the 
limitations placed on public employees. Analysis of existing jurisprudence for incumbent 
public employees to homeland security job applicants indicates applicants should be treated 
as private citizens.11 Analogous case law on free speech—such as precedents on loyalty 
oaths and unconstitutional conditions of employment—indicates that homeland security 
                                                 
6 U.S. Const. amend. I; and United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). 
7 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
8 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); and Pickering v. 
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
9 Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368 (2013); and Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400 (2016). 
10 Paul Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Ormrod, Practical Research: Planning and Design (New York: 
Pearson, 2016), 257. 
11 Pickering, 391 U.S. 563; Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410; and Connick, 461 U.S. 138. 
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job applicants would suffer various forms of government pressure to self-restrict their 
speech.12 Furthermore, counter-arguments in favor of restricting the speech of 
applicants—such as a rule that fear of having one’s speech restricted is insufficient to create 
standing to sue—can be distinguished as not addressing the specific concerns of homeland 
security job applicants.13 
Fourth, this thesis evaluates social science arguments and concludes that ethical, 
economic, and sociological theories support protecting homeland security job applicants’ 
free-speech rights. Ethical arguments for SMS are countered by homeland security 
employers’ responsibility to serve as role models and to consider the efficiency of SMS in 
a larger context.14 Economic theories indicate SMS is unjustified because of the lack of an 
opportunity for applicants to develop a contractual employer–applicant relationship and 
the factors in a cost–benefit formula argue against regulating applicant speech.15 
Sociological research indicates that applicants may alter their social media profiles to fulfill 
perceived employer desires and that homeland security employers risk groupthink by 
unconsciously selecting applicants whose social-media profiles match their views.16 
                                                 
12 Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); and Kathleen M. Sullivan, “Unconstitutional Conditions,” 
Harvard Law Review 102 (May 1989): 1415, https://doi.org/10.2307/1341337. 
13 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013). 
14 Harald Schmidt, Kristin Voigt, and Ezekiel J. Emanuel, “The Ethics of Not Hiring Smokers,” New 
England Journal of Medicine 368, no. 15 (April 2013): 1369–71, https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/ 
NEJMp1301951; and Mark V. Roehling, “Weight Discrimination in the American Workplace: Ethical 
Issues and Analysis,” Journal of Business Ethics 40, no. 2 (October 2002): 183, https://doi.org/10.1023/ 
a:1020347305736. 
15 Bruce Barry, Speechless: The Erosion of Free Expression in the American Workplace (San 
Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2007), 214, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-
nps/detail.action?docID=322124; Robert C. Bird, “Employment as a Relational Contract,” Journal of 
Business Law 8, no. 1 (2005): 149, https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jbl/articles/volume8/issue1/ 
Bird8U.Pa.J.Lab.&Emp.L.149%282005%29.pdf; and Richard Posner, “Free Speech in an Economic 
Perspective,” Suffolk University Law Review 20, no. 1 (1986): 8, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=2897&context=journal_articles. 
16 Mark Leary and Robin Kowalski, “Impression Management: A Literature Review and Two-
Component Model,” Psychological Bulletin 107, no. 1 (January 1990): 39, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-
2909.107.1.34; Julie Wade and Phil Roth, “Social Media and Personnel Selection: How Does New 
Technology Change an Old Game?,” in Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Information 
Systems: Exploring the Information Frontier, ed. Traci Carte, Armin Heinzl, and Cathy Urquhart 
(Atlanta: Association for Information Systems, 2015), 2, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0cfa/ 
0ec9c04baba52a70c98ba35c8931ef697537.pdf; and James E. Ricciuti, “Groupthink: A Significant Threat 
to the Homeland Security of the United States” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 40, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=762428. 
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Fifth, this thesis analyzes two publicly available policy documents related to the 
SMS of homeland security job applicants: the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police 
Department’s social media policy for applicants and the International Association of Chiefs 
of Police’s guidance on how to appropriately engage in SMS.17 Both documents take some 
steps toward protecting free-speech rights for homeland security job applicants, such as 
encouraging or requiring efforts to inform applicants of the SMS process and give 
applicants the opportunity to explain potentially problematic speech. However, many 
aspects of the documents increase the risks to applicant free-speech: the documents are 
vague as to what types of speech are unacceptable, they encourage applicants to self-restrict 
their speech, and they seek to perpetuate the existing law enforcement culture. 
Given this background and analysis, this thesis outlines steps homeland security 
employers should take to protect the rights of their job applicants, possible future research, 
and potential legal action. Homeland security employers can take affirmative steps such as 
providing clear notice about SMS and providing examples of disqualifying speech. Also, 
homeland security employers can take preventative steps—such as carefully wording their 
recruitment materials—to avoid implying SMS will serve as enforcement of a speech code 
and resisting the temptation to evaluate applicant social media activity as if it were the 
activity of incumbent employees. Future research could explore the social construct of 
social media. For example, as social media continue to proliferate, do people view it as 
becoming more serious and due more protections or less serious and due fewer protections? 
Future legal action—possibly sponsored by a free-speech rights advocacy group such as 
the American Civil Liberties Union—could provide the opportunity for judicial resolution 
of the question of the level of speech protections to which applicants are entitled. 
Homeland security employers must recruit the best talent to fulfill their missions, 
and social media screening provides additional and unique information when engaging in 
background investigations. However, unlike traditional background investigation 
                                                 
17 Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, Social Media Checks for Background 
Investigations, SO-16-06 (Washington, DC: Metropolitan Police Department, June 3, 2016), https://go. 
mpdconline.com/GO/SO_16_06.pdf; and Andrée Rose et al., Developing a Cybervetting Policy for Law 
Enforcement (Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, December 2010), http://www. 
iacpsocialmedia.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/CybervettingReport-2.pdf. 
xx 
techniques, social media screening includes the possibility that homeland security 
employers will infringe on the free-speech rights of their applicants. Homeland security 
employers should recognize these rights, acknowledge the risk that social media screening 
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In March 2013, the New York Post discovered racist, misogynistic, and anti-Semitic 
tweets by Joe Cassano, an emergency medical technician (EMT) with the New York City 
Fire Department (FDNY).1 The New York Post article revealed Cassano had suggested that 
“MLK could go kick rocks,” proposed forcing all women to have breast-enhancement 
surgery, and explained that he “liked Jews about as much as Hitler.”2 After the revelations, 
Cassano was forced to resign, ending a brief and ugly career with the FDNY. 
That is, until December 2017 when the FDNY hired Cassano as a firefighter.3 
While working as an EMT, Cassano had separately applied for the rank of firefighter.4 
That application proceeded on its own timeline, including a written exam, physical exam, 
and background investigation.5 After he passed these steps, the FDNY re-hired Cassano.6 
The outrage was swift, including a rally at city hall with members of the city council, the 
National Association of Colored People, and the FDNY Vulcans—the department’s black 
firefighter fraternal group.7  
The New York Post provided a free service for which many employers have spent 
time and resources: social media screening (SMS) of applicants’ social media history. 
Employees with a history of controversial social media can spark protests and lawsuits, 
especially in the current environment of racial unrest and revelations of sexual harassment. 
Technology has developed to expose these proclivities and screen for them. However, free-
                                                 
1 David Seifman, “EMT Son of FDNY Commish Resigns after Vile, Racist Twitter Rant,” New York 
Post, March 18, 2013, https://nypost.com/2013/03/18/emt-son-of-fdny-commish-resigns-after-vile-racist-
twitter-rant/. 
2 Seifman. 
3 Seifman, “EMT Son of FDNY Commish Resigns”; and Susan Edelman and Linda Massarella, 
“Hateful Son of Ex-FDNY Commish Hired as City Firefighter,” New York Post, December 20, 2017, 
https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/hateful-son-of-ex-fdny-commish-hired-as-city-firefighter/. 
4 Edelman and Massarella, “Hateful Son of Ex-FDNY Commish.” 
5 Edelman and Massarella. 
6 Edelman and Massarella. 
7 Edelman and Massarella. 
2 
speech jurisprudence has not kept pace with technological progress, leaving homeland 
security job applicants exposed to the potential that SMS will infringe on their free-speech 
rights. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Homeland security employers (e.g., police departments, fire departments, and 
federal agencies) that screen the social media of their job applicants should be aware of the 
risk of infringing on the applicants’ free-speech rights and take steps to mitigate that risk. 
The law on free-speech protections for homeland security job applicants is not established 
and is becoming increasingly important, as social media provide an expansive and 
permanently documented platform for individual speech. The law on free-speech 
restrictions for public employees is well established with ample case law governing 
incumbent employees. However, a case law review indicates no precedent regarding 
homeland security job applicants. 
Applicants’ free-speech rights may be affected when homeland security employers 
conduct background investigations before hiring. Such investigations include background 
checks for criminal records, drug use, and integrity. Increasingly, the investigations include 
the applicants’ social media history, whereby employers look for inflammatory statements 
or behavior indicating the potential for future misbehavior. As of 2016, Career Builder 
reported that 60 percent of employers engage in SMS, and the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police reported that 58 percent of police departments use SMS.8  
According to Diane Arthur, employers use background checks to “predict 
acceptable or unacceptable on-the-job behavior, allow employers to identify potentially 
unfit workers, and flush out factors that could prove detrimental on the job.”9 In general, 
William Woska notes employers have a “special duty . . . to investigate the prospective 
                                                 
8 Lauren Salm, “70 Percent of Employers Are Snooping Candidates’ Social Media Profiles,” Career 
Builder, June 15, 2017, https://www.careerbuilder.com/advice/social-media-survey-2017; and International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, “Social Media Survey” (Alexandria, VA: Center for Social Media, 2010), 
http://www.iacpsocialmedia.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Survey-Results-Document.pdf. 
9 Diane Arthur, Recruiting, Interviewing, Selecting & Orienting New Employees (New York: 
American Management Association, 2005), 232–233, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-
nps/detail.action?docID=243074. 
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employee's background when placing an individual in a position of trust.”10 Homeland 
security employers, particularly, must screen unfit applicants due to the sensitive nature of 
their operations and the public-facing nature of their employees.11 
Screening an applicant’s social media accounts may violate free-speech rights in 
two ways. First, employers may violate the rights of individual applicants by rejecting their 
employment applications based on past social media speech that the employer deems 
disqualifying for future employment. Second, employers may chill the speech of an entire 
group by establishing SMS policies that lead applicants to self-restrict their speech. 
Employers are likely unaware that they may be violating applicants’ rights because 
they are unlikely to face lawsuits. Regarding individual applicants, applicants may not 
know the reason they were not hired and, even if they did know, they might be unable to 
afford the attorney fees to sue. Regarding the chilling effect, the group faces a collective 
action problem in which they lack the ability to gather similar applicants.  
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY EMPLOYERS 
The infringement of the free-speech rights of homeland security job applicants is 
not a theoretical problem and has practical implications for homeland security employers. 
First, homeland security employers should serve as leaders in protecting all rights including 
free speech. Many homeland security employers recognize this responsibility. For 
example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s mission statement includes the obligation 
to “protect civil rights” and its core value of “rigorous obedience to the Constitution of the 
                                                 
10 William Woska, “Legal Issues for HR Professionals: Reference Checking/Background 
Investigations,” Public Personnel Management 36, no. 1 (2007): 87, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
009102600703600106. 
11 David Bradford, “Police Officer Candidate Background Investigation: Law Enforcement 
Management’s Most Effective Tool for Employing the Most Qualified Candidate,” Public Personnel 
Management 27, no. 4 (December 1998): 423, https://doi.org/10.1177/009102609802700401; and Matthew 




United States.”12 If homeland security employers disregard the risk that SMS diminishes 
civil rights, they are hampering their mission while attempting to achieve it.  
Second, social media screening can hinder recruitment and diversification efforts 
by homeland security employers. Police departments are already facing a recruitment 
challenge, as documented in RAND’s 2010 report Police Recruitment and Retention for 
the New Millennium, which documents the inflow and outflow dynamics that challenge 
departments in fully staffing their ranks.13 In the context of this recruiting challenge, the 
SMS of applicants may dissuade some individuals from applying for homeland security 
jobs. For example, the local media in Cleveland reports that “many blacks cite stigma and 
cop culture [and] avoid police recruiters.”14 If candidates have posted to a Black Lives 
Matter group or “liked” such a group on Facebook, they may rethink their ability to be 
hired by a police agency. Homeland security employers should take this possibility 
seriously and work to protect applicants’ free-speech rights to encourage recruitment 
efforts.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. When homeland security employers screen the social media of job 
applicants, what are the free-speech rights of those applicants?  
2. Do publicly available social-media screening policies of homeland 
security employers support or undermine applicants’ free-speech rights? 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Because social media screening is a form of employment background check, this 
literature review discusses academic views on background checks by examining their 
                                                 
12 “Mission & Priorities,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed December 3, 2018, https://www. 
fbi.gov/about/mission. 
13 Jeremy M. Wilson et al., Police Recruitment and Retention for the New Millennium (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2010), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG959.pdf. 
14 Phil Trexler and Tom Meyer, “Many Blacks Cite Stigma and Cop Culture, Avoid Police 
Recruiters,” WKYC, May 9, 2018, https://www.wkyc.com/article/news/investigations/many-blacks-cite-
stigma-and-cop-culture-avoid-police-recruiters/95-550249949.  
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frequency, efficacy, and legality. It investigates the traditional background checks of 
criminal records as well as drug and integrity tests by reviewing academic and government 
research, case law, and human resource management publications. Within this context, it 
examines SMS using similar sources. 
1. Criminal Background Checks  
Homeland security employers often use criminal records when conducting 
background checks on job applicants. In 2017, The National Association of Professional 
Background Screeners reported that 83 percent of surveyed employers checked candidates 
against a national crime database, and 87 percent checked candidates against a county or 
state crime database.15 Similarly, the Society for Human Resource Management reported 
that 69 percent of surveyed employers used criminal background checks in 2012.16 Public 
employers are even more aggressive: As early as 2001, Connerley, Arvey, and Bernardy 
indicated 50 percent of surveyed municipalities conducted criminal background checks on 
all municipal employees, and 100 percent conducted checks on all police officer and 
firefighter candidates.17 
There is mixed evidence on the effectiveness of criminal background checks, both 
on recidivism of criminal activity and on work performance. On recidivism, the U.S. 
Department of Justice has reported clear evidence by convicted criminals.18 However, 
Blumstein and Nakamura have determined that the likelihood of recidivism declines with 
                                                 
15 National Association of Professional Background Screeners, National Survey: Employers 
Universally Using Background Checks to Protect Employees, Customers and the Public (Raleigh, NC: 
National Association of Professional Background Screeners, 2017), https://pubs.napbs.com/pub.cfm?id= 
6E232E17-B749-6287-0E86-95568FA599D1. 
16 “Background Checking—The Use of Criminal Background Checks in Hiring Decisions,” Society 
for Human Resource Management, July 19, 2012, https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/ 
research-and-surveys/pages/criminalbackgroundcheck.aspx. 
17 Mary Connerley, Richard Arvey, and Charles Bernardy, “Criminal Background Checks for 
Prospective and Current Employees: Current Practices among Municipal Agencies,” Public Personnel 
Management 30, no. 2 (June 2001): 175, https://doi.org/10.1177/009102600103000204. 
18 Matthew Durose, Alexia Cooper, and Howard Snyder, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 
States in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2014), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf. 
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passing time to match that of the general population.19 For example, for those first arrested 
for assault at the age of 20, the likelihood of a second arrest declines to match that of the 
general population after 3.3 years.20 Similar patterns hold for burglary (3.2 years) and 
robbery (4.4 years).21 On work performance, there is limited research on the linkage 
between criminal records and poor work performance. One study actually counters most 
expectations; in 2016, Lundquist, Pager, Strader studied U.S. military enlistments and 
showed that those arrested for felonies were no more likely to be terminated than those 
without arrest records and were 32 percent more likely to be promoted.22 
Criminal background checks are subject to legal restrictions based on case law and 
legislation. For years, case law has prohibited denying employment because of an arrest 
record, typically because it causes a disparate impact under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.23 
Similarly, courts have ruled against a blanket policy of denying employment based on 
convictions unless the employer can demonstrate a link between the conviction and the 
duties and responsibilities involved with the position.24 Recent legislation has confirmed 
this trend. As of 2017, the National Employment Law Project reports that 29 states have 
“ban the box” laws that prohibit inquiring about criminal history before a job interview.25 
2. Drug Tests as Background Checks 
Homeland security employers have used drug tests as a form of background checks 
for years. In 1986, President Ronald Regan established the Federal Drug Free Workforce 
                                                 
19 Alfred Blumstein and Kiminori Nakamura, “Redemption in the Presence of Widespread Criminal 
Background Checks,” Criminology 47, no. 2 (May 2009): 327, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2009. 
00155.x. 
20 Blumstein and Nakamura, 339. 
21 Blumstein and Nakamura, 339. 
22 Jennifer Hickes Lundquist, Devah Pager, and Eiko Strader, “Does a Criminal Past Predict Worker 
Performance? Evidence from America’s Largest Employer,” Social Forces 96, no. 3 (2018): 1051, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/sox092. 
23 Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 102, 702 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
24 EEOC v. Peoplemark, Inc., 732 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2013). 
25 Beth Avery, “Ban the Box: U.S. Cities, Counties, and States Adopt Fair Hiring Policies,” National 
Employment Law Project, August 1, 2017, http://www.nelp.org/publication/ban-the-box-fair-chance-
hiring-state-and-local-guide/. 
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Program, requiring that federal agencies establish drug-testing programs for incumbents 
and applicants.26 Homeland security agencies are the most likely to use drug screening, 
with 95.4 percent of local law enforcement agencies using drug testing as of 2007.27 With 
the government’s leadership, the private sector followed: The Washington Post reports that 
the percent of employers testing at least some of their applicants rose from 21 percent in 
1987 to 81 percent in 1996, but then declined to 62 percent in 2004.28 
This decline may be due to a growing body of research questioning the 
effectiveness of drug tests. One of the first and most cited studies is a 1987 study by the 
U.S. Postal Service that tracked the employment outcomes of almost 5,000 job applicants, 
over half of whom tested positive for drug use.29 The study found that marijuana users had 
55 percent more industrial accidents and a 78 percent increase in absenteeism; cocaine 
users had 85 percent more industrial accidents and a 145 percent increase in absenteeism.30 
However, subsequent research has shown a weaker linkage between drug-use and counter-
productive work behavior. For example, the National Academy of Sciences considered that 
older workers—who are less likely to use drugs—are more experienced and therefore less 
likely to have accidents.31 When normalizing for this and similar correlations, the National 
Academy of Sciences found no “evidence of the deleterious effects of drugs—other than 
alcohol—on safety and other job performance indicators.”32 
                                                 
26 Exec. Order No. 12564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986), https://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/12564.html. 
27 Brian Reaves, Local Police Departments, 2007 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
December 2010), 11, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf. 
28 Lydia DePillis, “Companies Drug Test a Lot Less Than They Used To—Because It Doesn’t Really 
Work,” Washington Post, March 10, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/03/10/ 
companies-drug-test-a-lot-less-than-they-used-to-because-it-doesnt-really-
work/?utm_term=.4969db140a83. 
29 Craig Zwerling, James Ryan, and Endel John Orav, “The Efficacy of Pre-Employment Drug 
Screening for Marijuana and Cocaine in Predicting Employment Outcomes,” Journal of Occupational 
Medicine 264 no. 20 (November 1992): 2639, https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.1990.03450200047029. 
30 Zwerling, Ryan, and Orav, 2643. 
31 Jacques Normand, Richard O. Lempert, and Charles O’Brien, Under the Influence? Drugs and the 
American Work Force (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994), 135, https://ebookcentral. 
proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/reader.action?docID=3376672&query=. 
32 Normand, Lempert, and O’Brien, 107. 
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The legal standards for drug testing consist of questions about searches under the 
Fourth Amendment. In 1989, the Supreme Court determined that drug tests of incumbent 
employees constituted Fourth Amendment “searches” and, therefore, must be 
“reasonable.”33 That same day, in a different case, the Supreme Court ruled blanket testing 
could be reasonable if the employer balanced the privacy interests of the employee with 
the special needs of government employment, holding that the employees “required to 
carry firearms in the line of duty . . . have a diminished expectation of privacy.”34 
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld blanket testing of employees with 
clearance to classified information.35 Although the standard for testing applicants—as 
distinct from incumbent employees—has not been tested at the Supreme Court level, the 
Ninth Circuit used the same standard for evaluating drug testing policies for applicants, 
holding that public employers can only insist on drug tests for applicants for positions that 
are “safety sensitive.”36 
3. Integrity Tests as Background Checks 
Integrity testing is the practice of using a battery of questions to determine an 
applicant’s proclivity for unethical behavior.37 Statistics on the frequency of integrity 
testing are limited. In 1990, the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment estimated that 5,000 
to 6,000 employers were using integrity tests.38 The Society for Human Resource 
Management indicates that integrity tests became popular with employers after the 1988 
Employee Polygraph Protection Act prohibited private employers from requiring 
                                                 
33 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
34 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
35 Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F. 2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
36 Lanier v. City of Woodburn, 518 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008). 
37 Encyclopedia of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, s.v. “integrity testing,” accessed 
January 18, 2018, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412952651.n138. 
38 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Use of Integrity Tests for Pre-Employment 
Screening, OTA-SET-442 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 1990), 1, 
https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/1990/9042/9042.PDF. 
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employees to submit to a polygraph.39 However, by 2012, a Society for Human Resource 
Management poll indicated that only 20 percent of private employers used personality 
tests—a broader test that includes integrity aspects.40 
Although statistics on how frequently employers use integrity tests are sparse, there 
is considerable research on the effectiveness of integrity tests. The U.S. Office of 
Technology Assessment was one of the first to examine integrity tests systematically, 
finding inconclusive evidence on their effectiveness.41 For example, the office found that 
the tests correctly identified applicants as dishonest who later stole from their employers 
94 percent of the time.42 But the tests also classified applicants as dishonest who never 
stole from their employers 73–97 percent of the time.43 More recently, researchers have 
attempted to measure the integrity test’s predictive validity—the correlation between the 
test and some future measure it aims to predict.44 Van Iddekinge et al. conducted a meta-
analysis of 104 studies and found integrity tests had a predictive validity level of .32—a 
small but positive linkage explaining about 10 percent of counter-productive work 
behavior.45 In contrast, Muel Kaptein conducted a 2015 study comparing the effectiveness 
of various ethics programs (e.g., having a code of ethics, ethics training, or an ethics 
reporting line) and found “no evidence that pre-employment screening is helpful [in 
reducing unethical behavior].”46 
                                                 
39 Bill Roberts, “Your Cheating Heart,” Society for Human Resource Management, June 1, 2011, 
https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/pages/0611roberts.aspx. 
40 “SHRM Poll: Most Employers Don’t Use Personality Tests,” Society for Human Resource 
Management, February 1, 2012, https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/hr-topics/talent-acquisition/ 
Pages/MostEmployersDontUsePersonalityTests.aspx. 
41 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Use of Integrity Tests, 8. 
42 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 57. 
43 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 57. 
44 Encyclopedia of Research Design, s.v. “predictive validity,” accessed February 4, 2018, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412961288.n328. 
45 Chad Van Iddekinge et al., “The Criterion-Related Validity of Integrity Tests: An Updated Meta-
Analysis,” Journal of Applied Psychology 97, no. 3 (May 2012): 499, https://doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2010. 
54500471. 
46 Muel Kaptein, “The Effectiveness of Ethics Programs: The Role of Scope, Composition, and 
Sequence,” Journal of Business Ethics 132, no. 2 (December 2015): 429, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn. 
2464004. 
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Legally, courts have reviewed integrity tests as possibly violative of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA), the federal implied right to privacy, and a state’s express right 
to privacy. Regarding the ADA, employers should take care that an integrity test does not 
qualify as a “medical exam,” as it did when a sheriff’s office had a psychologist conduct a 
series of personality tests on an applicant.47 Regarding federal privacy, although the 
Supreme Court has established an implied right to privacy, Kimberli Black found 
“legislatures and courts have not extended this right to prohibit personality testing by public 
employers.”48 At the state level, Rhode Island and Massachusetts passed statutes 
prohibiting integrity tests.49 Moreover, California’s constitution includes an amendment 
specifically granting “privacy” as an inalienable right and enforcing it against both public 
and private actors.50 Thus, California has case law invalidating a personality test, using the 
stringent “compelling interest” standard to rule against an employer whose integrity test 
included matters of religious attitudes and sexual orientation.51 
4. Social Media Screening 
Social media screening, also known as cyber-vetting or social network screening, 
is the practice of employers searching for publicly available information online, 
particularly on social media sites, about potential hires.52 SMS is increasingly important 
given the proliferation of social media and their effect on communications. As to 
proliferation, the Pew Research Center reports that social media penetration of the U.S. 
population grew from 5 percent to 69 percent from 2005 to 2016.53 As to the effect, John 
                                                 
47 Barnes v. Cochran, 944 F.Supp. 897 (S.D. Fla. 1996). 
48 Kimberli Black, “Personality Screening in Employment,” American Business Law Journal 32, no. 1 
(May 1994): 69, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-1714.1994.tb00931.x. 
49 Larry R. Seegull and Emily J. Caputo, “When a Test Turns into a Trial,” Business Law Today 15, 
no. 3 (January/February 2006), https://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2006-01-02/caputo.html. 
50 Cal. Const., art. 1, § 1. 
51 Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 18 Cal. App. 4th 1200 (1991). 
52 Brenda Berkelaar, “Cybervetting, Online Information, and Personnel Selection,” Management 
Communication Quarterly 28, no. 4 (November 2014): 479, https://doi.org/10.1177/0893318914541966. 
53 “Social Media Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center, January12, 2017, http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
fact-sheet/social-media/. 
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Suler has documented the “online disinhibition effect,” arguing that online communication 
prompts people to act in ways they would not when in person because the medium provides 
anonymity, escapism into an online persona, and the removal of in-person social cues.54 
These factors combined with the permanent documentation of the internet make SMS 
attractive to employers. The remainder of this literature review discusses the following 
features of SMS: (a) the cost–benefit factors from a homeland security employer’s 
perspective, (b) the frequency of its use, (c) research on its effectiveness, and (d) the current 
laws governing SMS. 
a. Cost–Benefit Factors of Using SMS 
Homeland security employers generally find the cost–benefit calculation of SMS 
attractive. Benefits include reducing the risk of disruptive employees, ensuring smooth 
legal operations, and protecting themselves from negligent hiring lawsuits. First, disruptive 
employees generally exhibit bad judgment that hinders public safety agencies from 
working with their communities: a Fort Lauderdale police officer who offered racist 
statements on his Facebook account, a Utah police officer who posted a racist comment on 
a photo, and a Chicago police officer who espoused Islamophobia on the internet.55 
Although each example cites to an incumbent employee, SMS can prevent new applicants 
with such proclivities from joining public safety agencies. 
Second, for some agencies, the content of their employees’ social media could 
disrupt legal operations. In the regular course of operations, federal agents and police 
officers must often testify in court. Defense attorneys may attempt to “impeach” 
                                                 
54 John Suler, “The Online Disinhibition Effect,” Cyber Psychology & Behavior 7, no. 3 (June 2004): 
321, https://doi.org/10.1089/1094931041291295.  
55 Amanda Batchelor, “Fort Lauderdale Police Officer Fired over Social Media Posts,” WPLG, June 
29, 2015, https://www.local10.com/news/local/fort-lauderdale/fort-lauderdale-police-officer-fired-over-
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police-officer-resigns-amid-internal-investigation-into-racist-post-on-facebook/; and “Chicago Cop Cited 




testimony—to undermine its truthfulness.56 A common impeachment method is noting 
prior inconsistent statements.57 Defense attorneys have successfully used social media 
statements as prior inconsistent statements to impeach police officer testimony. For 
example, when a New York City police officer posted that he was “watching ‘Training 
Day’ to brush up on proper police procedure,” defense attorneys successfully argued that 
the viewing of “Training Day”—a movie that celebrates police corruption—contradicted 
the officer’s testimony that he had not planted a gun on the defendant.58 The accused was 
found not guilty.59 
Third, SMS can protect employers from exposing themselves to the legal risk of 
negligent hiring lawsuits, which are founded on the idea that employers can be liable for 
the actions of employees if the employer failed to “exercise reasonable care in choosing or 
retaining an employee.”60 Employers fare poorly in these cases and lose 73 percent of 
those that go to jury trials.61 Courts impose a higher duty of care on employers when the 
position includes greater exposure to the public and a chance for harm.62 Therefore, public 
safety employers may consider how SMS reduces their risk of a negligent hiring suit. For 
example, Fire Engineering, a firefighting management magazine, recommends SMS to 
minimize the risk of negligent hiring suits.63  
                                                 
56 “Federal Rules of Evidence: Rule 608,” Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, accessed 
January 17, 2018, https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_608. 
57 Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. 
58 Jim Dwyer, “The Officer Who Posted Too Much on Myspace,” New York Times, March 10, 2009, 
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59 Dwyer. 
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Costs to employers include the direct costs of conducting investigations and the 
indirect cost of reducing applicants’ perception of the employer. First, the direct costs of 
SMS are considered low. Cooley and Parks-Yancy determined, “Some employers have 
reduced their recruitment and screening costs by 50 percent” compared to in-person 
interview techniques.64 Saby Ghoshray, when studying the erosion of privacy by SMS, 
noted employers use SMS because of “its ease of access and cost advantage.”65 A 2009 
report developed by the Director of National Intelligence studied the cost of SMS for 
incumbents applying for classified security clearances and estimated the SMS cost per 
applicant at $375 to $650.66 Furthermore, the Washington Post reported in 2016 that 
private screening firms charge from $100 to $500 for SMS of an applicant.67 
Second, SMS has indirect costs, such as reducing applicant interest in working for 
the employer. When Stoughton, Thompson, and Meade tested this theory in two studies, 
they found that applicants who were told they had been evaluated by SMS viewed the 
potential employer as less attractive and had an increased likelihood of suing the 
employer.68 In the first study, student volunteers were surveyed after being informed that 
a potential employer had searched their social media profiles.69 The students who were 
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screened viewed the employer 5 percent less favorably than those who were not screened.70 
In the second study, freelance workers were surveyed after applying for a hypothetical 
job.71 Those who were screened viewed the employer 20 percent less favorably and were 
11 percent more likely to litigate.72 When engaging in SMS, public safety agencies risk 
poisoning their image with potential employees. 
b. Frequency of SMS 
Private employers are increasingly using SMS to check on candidates―although 
research differs on the scale of usage. Career Builder has surveyed employers annually 
about SMS and found the practice has increased significantly.73 The Society for Human 
Resource Management conducts a similar survey.74 Results of both surveys are 
summarized in Table 1. 
  
                                                 
70 Stoughton, Thompson, and Meade, 78. Attractiveness was measured on a Likert-type scale, with 
answers ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree, using statements such as “For me, this company 
would be good place to work.” 
71 Stoughton, Thompson, and Meade, 81. 
72 Stoughton, Thompson, and Meade, 84. Attractiveness and intention to litigate were measured on a 
Likert-type scale, with answers ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree, using statements such as 
“An organization that uses a hiring system like this would likely be sued by applicants.”  
73 Salm, “70 Percent of Employers Are Snooping.”  
74 “Using Social Media for Talent Acquisition,” Society for Human Resource Management, 
September 20, 2017, https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/Pages/ 
Social-Media-Recruiting-Screening-2015.aspx.  
15 
Table 1. Summary of Surveys of Employer Use of Social Media 
Screening75 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Career Builder
SMS of candidate 22% 45% 53% NA 37% 39% 43% 52% 60% 70%
Internet search of candidate NA NA 43% NA NA NA 45% 51% 59% 69%
Society for Human Resource Management
SMS of candidate 13% NA NA 18% NA 20% NA NA 39% NA
Internet search of candidate 34% NA NA 26% NA 28% NA NA 34% NA  
 
Homeland security employers are also using SMS at increasing rates, with large 
agencies initiating the policy at various times. As to large agencies, the Department of 
Homeland Security initiated an SMS program for incumbents and applicants in 2015.76 
Similarly, in 2016, the Director of National Intelligence announced an SMS program for 
security clearances of any government employee, requiring that applicants reveal the 
names of hidden Facebook “friends” and all active Twitter aliases.77 As to smaller 
agencies, Tufts, Jacobson, and Stevens surveyed 172 local government agencies in North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, finding that only 14 percent conduct SMS and 23 
percent use internet searches.78 Also, the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
                                                 
75 Salm, “70 Percent of Employers Are Snooping”; and Society for Human Resource Management, 
“Using Social Media for Talent Acquisition.” 
76 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Official Usage of Publicly 
Available Information, Policy Instruction IA-900 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
January 13, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/dhs_policy_re_official_use_of_ 
public_social_media_info_-_01.13.2015.pdf. 
77 Director of National Intelligence, Collection, Use, and Retention of Publicly Available Social 
Media Information in Personnel Security Background Investigations and Adjudications, Security Executive 
Agent Directive 5 (Washington, DC: Director of National Intelligence, May 12, 2016), https://www.dni. 
gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/SEAD5-12May2016.pdf. 
78 Shannon Howle Tufts, Willow S. Jacobson, and Mattie Sue Stevens, “Status Update: Social Media 
and Local Government Human Resource Practices,” Review of Public Personnel Administration 35, no. 2 
(2015): 201, https://doi.org/10.1177/0734371x14558066.  
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surveyed small and midsized police departments and found that SMS has been steadily 
increasing. 79 The results are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2. Social Media Screening of Police Department Applicants80 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
International Association of Chiefs of Police  
SMS of candidate NA NA 37% 44% 51% 49% 54% 58% 58% NA  
 
c. Research on the Effectiveness of SMS 
Research on the effectiveness of SMS focuses on two questions: Did SMS discover 
illegal or unwanted behavior by the candidate, and is unwanted behavior on the internet 
indicative of unwanted behavior as an employee?  
First, numerous surveys have sought to determine whether SMS finds unwanted 
online behavior. Edward Appel’s research indicates that approximately 10 percent of 
applicants have items online that warrant concern over their suitability (e.g., drug or 
alcohol use, personal financial troubles, or sexual/criminal/racial issues).81 Career 
Builder’s annual survey contributes to this question; the results are summarized in Table 
3. 
  
                                                 
79 International Association of Chiefs of Police, “Social Media Survey.” This citation is representative 
of press releases from previous years that the author used to build the summary table. 
80 International Association of Chiefs of Police. 
81 Appel, Cybervetting, 49–55. 
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Table 3. Unwanted Behavior Revealed by Social Media Screening82 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Career Builder
Discovered unwanted behavior 34% 35% 43% NA 34% 43% 51% 48% 49% 44%
     - Provocative photos NA NA NA NA 49% 50% 46% 46% 46% 39%
     - Drugs/alcohol NA NA NA NA 45% 48% 41% 40% 43% 38%
     - Discriminatory comments NA NA NA NA 28% 28% 28% 29% 33% 32%  
 
Second, academic research attempts to confirm the suspected link between 
unwanted behavior online and unwanted behavior in person. Stoughton, Thompson, and 
Meade categorized online behavior into “badmouthing” and “substance-use” postings and 
then compared their frequency to the results of a personality questionnaire measuring 
employee agreeableness, extraversion, and conscientiousness.83 The results indicated that 
“online badmouthing behaviors can be used to infer relatively low agreeableness. In 
addition, postings related to alcohol and drug use can be said to be online manifestations 
of extraversion.” 84 Measures on conscientiousness were not statistically significant.85 
Although this study successfully linked online and in-person behavior, it merely considered 
in-person behavioral traits, not actual counter-productive work behavior. 
d. Laws Governing SMS 
Legislatures and courts have established some laws governing SMS. These laws 
cover the possibility of discrimination, obligations under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 
and laws prohibiting employers from requesting social media passwords. Although there 
are tangential references to free speech, there seems to be no established rule of law on 
SMS and its impact on free speech. 
                                                 
82 Salm, “70 Percent of Employers Are Snooping.” 
83 William Stoughton, Lori Thompson, and Adam Meade, “Big Five Personality Traits Reflected in 
Job Applicants’ Social Media Postings,” Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking 16, no. 11 
(November 2013): 803, https://doi.org/10.1089/cyber.2012.0163. 
84 Stoughton, Thompson, and Meade, 803. 
85 Stoughton, Thompson, and Meade, 803. 
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First, courts have found that employers may inadvertently discriminate against 
applicants by discovering protected characteristics through SMS. The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission is charged with enforcing anti-discrimination laws such as the 
Civil Rights Act, the Equal Pay Act, the Age Discrimination Act, and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.86 Collectively, these laws prohibit discrimination based on race, color, 
sex, religion, national origin, age, and disability.87 For employers, even cursory SMS may 
divulge the applicants’ membership in such a category and expose employers to the risk of 
litigation for even subconscious discrimination. For example, Alessandro and Fong found 
that Muslim candidates were 13 percent less likely to receive interview invitations than 
Christian candidates.88 Similarly, SMS may disparately impact certain minorities who are 
more inclined to have social media accounts or less inclined to preemptively edit them for 
SMS. Pew Research Center reports that Facebook use among racial subsets is roughly 
consistent among whites (71 percent), blacks (67 percent), and Latinos (73 percent), but 
Instagram use varies significantly (21 percent, 38 percent, and 34 percent, respectively).89 
Therefore, an SMS screen that surveys Instagram could have a disparate impact on blacks 
and Latinos without any intent to discriminate. 
Second, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) imposes obligations on employers 
when they outsource SMS to a third party. Congress passed the FCRA in 1970, granting 
enforcement power to the Federal Trade Commission, which has interpreted the FCRA 
broadly to include SMS reports generated by third-party firms.90 Third-party firms create 
                                                 
86 “Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination: Questions and Answers,” U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, November 21, 2009, https://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html. 
87 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  
88 Alessandro Acquisti and Christina Fong, “An Experiment in Hiring Discrimination via Online 
Social Networks” (unpublished thesis, July 17, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2031979. 
89 Jens Manuel Krogstad, “Social Media Preferences Vary by Race and Ethnicity,” Pew Research 
Center, February 3, 2015, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/02/03/social-media-preferences-
vary-by-race-and-ethnicity/. 
90 Maneesha Mithal to Renee Jackson (official letter, Federal Trade Commission, May 9, 2011), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/closing_letters/social-intelligence-corporation/ 
110509socialintelligenceletter.pdf. Note that this is merely a letter, not a law or regulation, and has not yet 
been challenged in court. 
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reports that provide useful information without disclosing membership in a protected 
category.91 If an employer uses a third-party service and decides not to hire an applicant, 
the FCRA requires that the employer “provide job applicants with their background report, 
summary of rights, and a ‘real opportunity’ to contest the contents of the background 
report.”92 If the employer instead conducts SMS in-house, the employer risks litigation, as 
it may discover an applicant’s protected status as defined under anti-discrimination laws.93 
Thus, employers using SMS may find themselves in a legal catch-22.  
Third, Congress has considered and numerous states have passed laws prohibiting 
employers from requesting social media passwords from applicants. At the federal level, 
Representative Elliot Engle (D, NY) proposed language for the Social Networking Online 
Protection Act; it has been standing in committee since 2013.94 States have been more 
successful. The National Council on State Legislatures, which annually updates state 
adoptions, indicates 26 states have enacted laws prohibiting employers from requesting 
social media passwords.95 The issue has been well researched at law schools; numerous 
law review articles have been written in favor of and against these laws.96 
                                                 
91 “Social Media Screening,” Risk Aware, accessed January 17, 2018, http://riskaware.com/our-
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There is limited research on the impact of SMS on applicants’ free-speech rights. 
Edward Appel mentions it as a concern and reviews a series of cases, but all the cases relate 
to incumbent employees.97 Even in a law review article explicitly looking at the rights of 
public-sector employees in the context of social media, William Herbert does not address 
applicants’ rights.98 Moreover, in a full chapter on legal concerns about using social media 
in candidate selection, Schmidt and O’Connor review laws enforcing civil rights and 
privacy rights but make no mention of the right to free speech.99 The lack of research on 
the free-speech rights of job applicants likely results from the “state action requirement,” 
a rule that only government, not private, actors can violate most constitutional rights.100 
As most SMS research considers all employees, there is less focus on the subset of public 
employees―and even less on the sub-subset of homeland security employees. 
This literature review reveals three themes about background checks. First, 
employers are expanding the use of background checks; for employers, more information 
is always better. Second, despite conflicting research on their effectiveness, employers 
continue to use background checks. Third, employers will expand their use of background 
checks, possibly infringing on applicants’ rights until the law evolves to protect applicants. 
This lack of protection in the law deserves more research, which is the goal of this thesis.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Lacking legal guidance on the rights of applicants, homeland security employers 
may be unaware that they risk violating individuals’ free-speech rights or chilling the 
speech of an entire group. This thesis seeks to determine the free speech rights of 
                                                 
97 Appel, Cybervetting, 97–100. 
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applicants, raise awareness among homeland security employers about those rights, and 
provide guidance on how to protect them during pre-employment screening. 
Chapter II provides the legal background on free speech as a First Amendment 
Right, with a specific focus on the more limited rights of public employees. Chapter III 
presents a content analysis of existing case law to show that there is no existing 
jurisprudence on the free-speech rights of homeland security job applicants. Chapters IV 
and V consider legal and social science arguments, respectively, that homeland security 
job applicants should be entitled to the full First Amendment protections of private citizens 
and not the limited rights of public employees. Chapter VI summarizes two public 
documents that offer policy and guidance on social media screening for homeland security 
job applicants and evaluates these documents for elements supporting or undermining the 
free-speech rights of applicants. Finally, Chapter VII offers recommendations for future 
research, possible legal action, and steps that homeland security employers can take to 
protect the rights of applicants for employment. 
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II. BACKGROUND ON FREE SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
This chapter provides the background on Americans’ right to free speech. First, this 
chapter describes general First Amendment analysis: the state action requirement and the 
two standards of review. Second, it reviews the free-speech rights of private citizens, using 
examples to illustrate when speech is and is not protected. Finally, this chapter reviews the 
free-speech rights of public employees and how it has evolved over the years. 
A. FREE-SPEECH ANALYSIS IN GENERAL 
Americans’ right to free speech derives from the First Amendment of the 
Constitution: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”101 
Although the First Amendment refers only to Congress, the Supreme Court extended its 
application by interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as applying the Bill of Rights to all 
levels of government.102 Therefore, the First Amendment restricts all agencies of federal, 
state, and local governments from violating individuals’ right to free speech. 
The First Amendment prohibits only the government’s restriction of speech, which 
is known as the “state action” requirement. As Justice Joseph Bradley explains, “It is state 
action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights 
is not the subject-matter of the Amendment.”103 The Supreme Court has found state action 
in such varied activities as a shipbuilder coordinating a company town, a private sports 
organization established by state law, and a state pharmacy regulator prohibiting 
pharmacies from publishing prices.104  
                                                 
101 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
102 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
103 United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). 
104 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic 
Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001); and Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
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When the government restricts speech, courts evaluate the restriction’s 
constitutionality under one of two tests. First, restrictions on time, place, and manner of 
speech are tested under the “rational basis” standard: Does any rational basis exist to justify 
the government’s restriction on speech?105 The rational basis test only allows the 
restriction if it (1) is content-neutral, (2) “narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest,” and (3) leaves open “ample alternative channels for 
communication.”106 For example, if a government restricts protests from occurring in the 
town square between the hours of 11:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m., courts will test this restriction 
using the rational basis standard.  
Second, restrictions on speech because of its content are tested under the “strict 
scrutiny” standard: Is the restriction “necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling 
state interest?”107 For example, if a government restricts a protest advocating for lower 
taxes or stricter gun control, courts will test this restriction using the strict scrutiny 
standard. The first step in free-speech analysis is determining the appropriate test, which 
often determines the issue because the strict scrutiny test is difficult to satisfy.108 
B. PRIVATE CITIZENS’ FREE-SPEECH PROTECTIONS 
Although private citizens have the broadest possible free-speech protections, they 
are not totally unencumbered. A few examples illustrate the protected and unprotected 
speech of private citizens. For protected speech, the chosen examples show how courts 
have had a broad conception of free speech, including speech critical of the government 
and made on the internet, which may eventually include online speech made by public job 
applicants. For unprotected speech, the chosen examples show where courts draw the line 
for acceptable speech, which may serve as a starting point for courts considering what 
speech is unacceptable for public job applicants. 
                                                 
105 Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law (St. Paul, MN: Foundation Press, 2000), 791. 
106 Ward v. Rock, 491 U.S. 781, 789 (1989). 
107 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995). 
108 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 791. 
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1. Examples of Protected Speech 
The First Amendment protects almost all speech, as shown in three examples. One 
example shows the importance courts give the right to free speech by protecting even 
speech critical of the government, which is a common form of speech when government 
employees and job applicants complain about their employer. A second example shows the 
broad conception of the act of speaking, particularly the courts’ consideration of whether 
online activities of public job applicants qualify as speech. A final example shows that 
courts consider online speech similar to in-person speech, which is important when 
considering how public employers may treat social media behavior. 
One of the most vivid forms of speech critical of the government is the burning of 
the American flag in protest. In Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court confirmed that even 
such speech is protected.109 Johnson burned an American flag at the 1984 Republican 
National Convention.110 Texas convicted him of violating a state statute prohibiting 
“desecration of a venerated object.”111 Johnson appealed, citing his right to free speech.112 
Texas countered that it was justified in arresting Johnson to keep the peace and venerate a 
national symbol.113 The Supreme Court ruled for Johnson. On keeping the peace, the court 
found that facts did not indicate impending violence.114 On the importance of the flag as a 
national symbol, “government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because 
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”115 Even for speech destroying the 
most important national symbol, the court upheld Johnson’s right to free speech. 
The right to free speech also protects citizens from being forced to speak, which is 
shown in West Virginia v. Barnett.116 In 1942, West Virginia established a state law 
                                                 
109 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
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requiring schools to teach civics and the “principles and spirit of Americanism.”117 The 
state board of education interpreted this as allowing it to require the recitation of the Pledge 
of Allegiance to the American Flag.118 The religious teachings of Jehovah’s Witnesses 
prohibit them from worshiping “graven images”—things of this world.119 When a young 
Jehovah’s Witness refused to recite the pledge and was disciplined, his parents sued the 
state for violation of his free-speech rights.120 The Supreme Court ruled for the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, holding that “no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by 
word or act their faith therein.”121 Among various arguments, the majority emphasized 
that forced displays of national unity are more likely to hinder unity than to show citizens 
the principles of freedom enshrined in the Constitution are applied equally to all, including 
symbols of America itself. 
When Congress attempted to regulate the internet, the Supreme Court supported a 
lower court ruling that restrictions on free speech on the internet must not be overbroad. 
The Child Online Protection Act (COPA) prohibited commercial websites from sharing 
“material harmful to minors,” which was to be judged by “contemporary community 
standards.”122 Among other issues, the Third Circuit found COPA to be overbroad because 
(1) publishers could never be sure whether their content was harmful to minors because 
COPA did not define minors, and (2) “contemporary community standards” was unclear 
because publishers could not know who made up a contemporary community in the context 
of an international internet with infinite storage.123 When such a law lacks clear guidelines 
and is overbroad, it is unconstitutional because the government cannot ban “unprotected 
speech if a substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the 
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process.”124 Importantly, the court declined to establish a weakened right to free speech 
for internet speech. 
Although many other examples exist, these three show the Supreme Court has 
upheld free speech in the face of pressure to support national symbols and pressure to 
protect children. The government can pursue goals of that importance, but it must do so in 
the least restrictive method possible. The next sub-section shows examples in which the 
government satisfied that test. 
2. Examples of Unprotected Speech 
Courts allow government restrictions on speech in certain cases, as shown in three 
examples. One example demonstrates that courts will allow restrictions when the speech 
endangers the government, an argument public employers may use for screening 
candidates. Another example shows that speech can be restricted when inciting violence, 
which is important for SMS as some online speech can quickly become inflamed. A final 
example considers obscene speech, which is important because the internet can be a 
significant source of obscenity, whereby possible job applicants may take on alternate 
personas. 
One of the best-known axioms about free speech is that it does not protect one from 
“falsely shouting fire in a theatre.”125 Although this quote is part of Schenck v. United 
States, the case did not involve falsely shouting “fire” but young men resisting the draft 
during World War I.126 Schenck mailed thousands of fliers to draft-aged men urging them 
not to submit to the draft.127 The federal government arrested him for violation of the 
Espionage Act of 1917, which prohibited obstruction of recruitment for the armed 
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services.128 The Supreme Court ruled that the government can restrict speech that 
“create[s] a clear and present danger that will bring about the substantive evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent.”129 Because it was lawful for Congress to draft young 
men, it was, therefore, lawful for Congress to restrict the speech of those creating a “clear 
and present danger” undermining that effort. 
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court determined that “fighting 
words” that incite violence are not protected.130 When a town marshal responded to 
complaints about Chaplinsky disturbing the peace by preaching in the town square, 
Chaplinsky responded by berating the marshal and calling him a “God damned racketeer” 
and “a damned Fascist.”131 For this, Chaplinsky was arrested for violating a New 
Hampshire statute that prohibited directing any “offensive, derisive or annoying word to 
any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place.”132 Chaplinsky 
appealed his conviction all the way to the Supreme Court, claiming the statute violated his 
freedom of speech.133 The court rejected this argument and upheld the code, holding that 
the government can prohibit “fighting words” provided the law is “carefully drawn so as 
not unduly to impair liberty of expression.”134 
The Supreme Court allowed restrictions on obscene speech and refined the 
definition of “obscene” in Roth v. United States.135 A federal court convicted Roth for 
publishing literary erotica and pornography in violation of a federal statute prohibiting the 
publication of “obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy” material.136 The Supreme Court 
upheld the conviction, ruling that the government need not allow all speech but can restrict 
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that which is “utterly without redeeming social importance.”137 Over the years, the 
definition of obscene has evolved from the Roth definition to “I know it when I see it” to 
that which lacks in serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.138 Nevertheless, 
consistent through the years is the fundamental holding that not all speech is protected, and 
obscenity can be restricted. 
Though there are more examples, these three cases show when the Supreme Court 
has allowed the government to restrict speech. In these cases, the court found that 
protecting against clear and present danger to national security, fighting words, and 
obscenity are all important government goals. Moreover, the court found that the 
government must use the least restrictive means possible to achieve those goals. Given this 
background on the free-speech right of private citizens, the next section considers free-
speech restrictions on public employees. 
C. FREE-SPEECH RESTRICTIONS ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES  
Public employees are a unique group for free-speech protections. On the one hand, 
they are citizens and are entitled to constitutional and civil rights. On the other, as public 
employees, their speech may be construed as representing the government or may interfere 
with effective government administration. Jurisprudence on the free-speech rights of public 
employees has evolved from a very restrictive rule before 1968 to a more accommodating 
balancing test thereafter. More recently, courts have applied public employee free-speech 
jurisprudence to a new venue: social media. 
1. Pre-1968 Public Employee Free Speech 
Before 1968, public employees had very limited free-speech rights, and 
governments could limit speech and terminate employees for almost any reason. The 
classic formulation of this idea came in 1892, in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford.139 
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McAuliffe was a police officer and was terminated by the mayor for supporting a political 
party while off duty.140 McAuliffe appealed the termination to the Massachusetts Court of 
Appeals, which upheld the termination.141 The court justified the termination with the 
famous construction “the petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he 
has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”142 In other words, the court upheld the right 
of public employers to restrict the speech of employees and observed that by accepting 
employment, employees also accept these restrictions. 
Although McAuliffe was a state court decision, the Supreme Court embraced the 
view that government employment implied restricted free-speech rights in United Public 
Workers v. Mitchell.143 In response to the political activities of public-sector unions, 
Congress passed the Hatch Act, which prohibited federal employees from taking “any 
active part in political management or in political campaigns.”144 When a federal 
employee was terminated under the Hatch Act for serving as a ward executive for a political 
party, the employee sued, claiming that the Hatch Act violated his right to free speech.145 
The Supreme Court upheld his termination and the constitutionality of the Hatch Act, 
ruling that Congress’ power to ensure the nation’s stability was more important than the 
free-speech rights of federal employees. In the view of the court at this time, such 
employees’ free speech could be sufficiently voiced at the ballot box by voting.146 
2. Post-1968 Public Employee Free Speech 
In 1968, the Supreme Court reversed years of precedent restraining public 
employee free speech and began balancing employees’ rights with the needs of government 
employers. In later cases, the court clarified this balancing test by requiring that employees 
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must be speaking on matters of public concern and must be speaking as private citizens for 
speech to be protected. 
The court established its balancing test in Pickering v. Board of Education. 
Pickering was a teacher who publicly criticized the financial management of his school 
district.147 The school district had sought approval to increase funding via a bond issue 
and tax increase.148 Pickering wrote a letter to the editor of a local newspaper in which he 
contended that the board was incompetent and was misallocating funds.149 The board held 
an administrative hearing, determined that Pickering was undermining the goals of the 
district, and fired him.150 The state court upheld the termination because Pickering’s 
acceptance of the teaching position precluded him from speaking about the administration 
of the school board.151 At the time, the state court was properly applying the Supreme 
Court’s precedent on free-speech rights of public employees. Pickering appealed to the 
Supreme Court, seeking a reversal of this rule. 
In Pickering, the Supreme Court reversed its previous jurisprudence and recognized 
that public employees do not forego all free-speech rights when accepting public 
employment.152 The court indicated that the new rule should require a balancing test 
between two priorities.153 First, any public employee has an interest “as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern.”154 The court justified this interest in the 
need for an informed public opinion, the need for free debate, and the need for citizens to 
speak freely without fear of reprisal.155 Second, the government has an interest “as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
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employees.”156 The court justified this interest as maintaining discipline and harmony 
among employees, establishing trust and loyalty between supervisors and subordinates, and 
enabling efficiency in providing public services.157 These justifications are important 
because they serve as factors that future courts might consider when balancing the rights 
of employees against the interests of employers. 
Later, in Connick v. Meyers, the Supreme Court clarified that for the balancing test 
to apply and protect an employee, the employee must be speaking on matters of public 
concern.158 Connick was an assistant district attorney who was happy with her position.159 
The district attorney, Meyers, was happy with her work but sought to transfer her to another 
position.160 Connick became upset and resisted the transfer.161 When Meyers finally 
ordered the transfer, Connick distributed a questionnaire to fellow assistant district 
attorneys inquiring about work conditions.162 When Meyers discovered this, he accused 
Connick of fomenting discontent among the workforce and fired her.163 
The Supreme Court upheld her termination without undertaking the Pickering 
balancing test because the court determined that Meyers was not speaking on a matter of 
public concern but about a private matter.164 The court noted that the original formation 
of the Pickering test included the phrase “public concern” for a reason: employers need 
latitude when managing their offices.165 Courts should use the Pickering test only after 
considering the threshold of whether the employee was speaking on a matter of “political, 
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social, or other concern to the community” when considering the “content, form, and 
context” of the speech.166 
The Supreme Count continued to refine the Pickering test in Garcetti v. Ceballos 
by clarifying that for it to apply, the employee must be speaking as a private citizen and 
not as an employee.167 Ceballos was an assistant deputy attorney in Los Angeles.168 When 
Ceballos discovered inaccuracies in an affidavit, he investigated and developed the opinion 
that the affidavit was faulty and insufficient to justify prosecuting the case.169 Ceballos 
presented these findings to his supervisors in an internal memo.170 The supervisors 
dismissed his concerns and directed him to continue to prosecute the case.171 Ceballos did 
so.172 However, afterward, he felt he suffered adverse employment actions due to his 
resistance, such as involuntary transfers and a lack of promotion.173 He initiated a 
grievance claiming his memo was a form of speech that should be protected.174 The 
grievance was denied, and Ceballos appealed all the way to the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court upheld the finding that Ceballos did not suffer adverse 
employment action and ruled that for the Pickering test to apply, an employee must be 
speaking in a private capacity. The court clarified Pickering by adding another threshold 
question: Was the employee speaking pursuant to one’s official duties?175 If so, the 
Pickering test does not apply, even to possibly protect the employee.176 The court 
reemphasized the need for government agencies to operate efficiently and not to 
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“constitutionalize the employee grievance.”177 Moreover, the court noted there is no 
private version of Ceballos’s speech; a letter to the editor can be written by either a private 
citizen or a public employee speaking as a private citizen, but an internal memo can be 
written only by an employee.178 
Synthesizing the line of Supreme Court cases after 1968 leads to a series of 
threshold questions and a balancing test. Was the person speaking as a private citizen? If 
so, was the content of the speech related to a matter of public concern? If so, does the 
interest of the speaker in exercising one’s right to free speech outweigh the interest of the 
public employer in efficient operations? Only when all three questions are answered in the 
affirmative is the speech protected by the First Amendment. 
3. Public Employee Free Speech in the Age of Social Media 
As the notion of speech has evolved to include speech conveyed on social media, 
courts have had to adapt free-speech jurisprudence to this new arena. These cases focus on 
two issues. First, does the particular form of social media activity even qualify as speech? 
Second, can public employers establish employee handbook policies specific to social 
media, and how should those policies be evaluated regarding free-speech rights? 
When faced with questions about social media actions, such as posting photos or 
liking another’s social media post, courts have found these actions qualify as speech. The 
Supreme Court led the way on this issue by ruling that the federal government could not 
restrict indecent communications in internet chat rooms made from public libraries.179 The 
government had sought to regulate the internet as if it were television broadcast airwaves, 
which are regulated by the Federal Communications Commission.180 However, the court 
held that the internet was different and warranted full free-speech protections because any 
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individual could “become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from 
any soapbox.”181 
Following the Supreme Court’s lead, a federal district court ruled that posting 
photographs qualifies as speech.182 Two high-school students posted lewd photos to 
Myspace and Facebook.183 When the school discovered the posts, it suspended the 
students from their athletic team.184 The students complained that the school was violating 
their free-speech rights.185 The district court ruled that the action of posting to the social 
media pages qualified as speech.186 The court justified this decision with an analogy to the 
precedent finding that posting photos in a physical display unit in a history department 
qualified as speech.187 Furthermore, the court cited to the Supreme Court’s ruling that 
“First Amendment protections for speech extend fully to communications made through 
the medium of the internet.”188 
Finally, even the briefest of all forms of social media speech—the like button on 
Facebook—qualifies as speech for purposes of First Amendment analysis.189 After 
winning re-election, a sheriff fired employees who had supported his opponent, including 
one employee whose only form of support was to like a post of the opponent on 
Facebook.190 When the employee asserted his speech was protected, the federal district 
court had to determine whether liking a post on Facebook qualified as speech. The court 
considered that the action of liking a post resulted in linking the opponent’s campaign 
Facebook page to the employee’s own page and that the linking included an endorsement 
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that the user literally likes or endorses the content.191 Therefore, whatever the content may 
be, the like button serves as the digital equivalent of posting a sign on one’s lawn and 
qualifies as speech deserving of First Amendment protection. 
Second, courts are willing to evaluate the constitutionality of social media policies 
in employee handbooks for public employees before any alleged infraction occurs. For 
example, in Liverman v. City of Petersburg, the police department issued a social media 
policy that stated “negative comments on the internal operations . . . are not protected by 
the First Amendment free speech clause, in accordance with established case law.”192 A 
federal district court noted that social media only appear to be a novel issue but in fact can 
be analyzed as any other speech policy: “What matters to the First Amendment analysis is 
not only the medium of the speech, but the scope and content of the restriction.”193 Using 
this analysis, the court found the City of Petersburg’s policy to be unconstitutionally 
overbroad because the policy, if applied, would restrict free speech.194 
D. CONCLUSION 
These cases show that courts have established a standard for the free-speech rights 
of public employees and have considered whether online activities qualify as speech. 
Combined, they provide clear jurisprudence for courts on the free-speech rights of public 
employees when the employees’ speech occurs online. However, these cases do not address 
the free-speech rights of job applicants. The next chapter seeks to determine whether courts 
have wrestled with the rights of public job applicants as distinct from incumbent public 
employees. 
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III. EXISTING LAW ON THE FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY JOB APPLICANTS 
Is there existing legal jurisprudence on the free-speech rights of homeland security 
job applicants? The question presents the challenge of proving a negative—that among the 
thousands of cases on free speech, none establish a rule on the free-speech rights of public 
job applicants. This chapter responds to this challenge by describing the LexisNexis 
database of case law, explaining the content analysis research method, and applying this 
method to the search results from the database. 
A. THE LEXISNEXIS CASE LAW DATABASE 
LexisNexis is an electronic database providing those in the legal field with access 
to statutes, case law, law review journals, and secondary sources. As of 2017, LexisNexis 
had digitized and categorized over 180 million federal and state court cases.195 LexisNexis 
allows users to screen these cases using a “citator,” a depth of discussion filter, a 
jurisdiction filter, and a keyword search function. 
LexisNexis offers a citator, which allows users to follow a major case and see how 
its rule was applied by later courts in slightly different circumstances.196 LexisNexis has 
categorized cases into positive, negative, or neutral treatments of precedent cases—cases 
that have considered similar facts and issues and established the rule of law for future 
cases.197 Subsequent courts may give the precedent case positive treatment and follow its 
rule, or subsequent cases may give the precedent case negative treatment and override its 
ruling. LexisNexis’s citator—under the brand name “Shepard’s citations”—allows users 
to screen subsequent cases by each type of treatment.198 
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Also, LexisNexis offers a “depth of discussion” search that allows users to screen 
subsequent cases by how much emphasis the court gave the precedent case.199 LexisNexis 
divides discussion depth into four categories. First, the analyzed category indicates that a 
court “fully considered the cited reference.”200 Second, the discussed category indicates 
that a court “discusses the cited reference with some measure of analysis.”201 Third, the 
mentioned category indicates that a court “mentions the cited reference but does so 
briefly.”202 Fourth, the cited category indicates that a court “cites to the reference with 
minimal if any discussion.”203 When screening for cases citing a precedent, these depth-
of-discussion indicators allow users to focus only on cases that significantly use the ruling 
in the underlying precedent case and screen out cases that reference the underlying 
precedent tangentially. 
Finally, LexisNexis allows users to screen by jurisdiction and search by keyword. 
Users can screen results to see only federal courts such as the Supreme Court, federal circuit 
courts of appeal, and federal district courts.204 Also, users can search within search results 
for keywords.205 For example, users can search within the cases citing to Roe v. Wade for 
only those using the word “fetus.”206 
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B. CONTENT ANALYSIS RESEARCH METHOD 
Content analysis is a research method whereby the researcher analyzes a body of 
human communications for patterns to answer a research question.207 Content analysis 
proceeds via four steps. First, the researcher establishes a question.208 Second, the 
researcher chooses a specific form of communication and body of material to study—
limiting the body to a reasonable size if necessary.209 Third, the researcher identifies in 
advance the specific characteristic sought in the body of material.210 Fourth, the researcher 
scrutinizes the material for the specific characteristic and marks each item in a binary 
fashion as including or not including the characteristic.211 Then, the researcher quantifies 
and summarizes the results to answer the established question.212 
For example, a researcher might evaluate the intensity of news coverage on 
Hurricane Katrina. First, the researcher would establish a question, such as “How many 
news stories during a specific time period were about Hurricane Katrina?” Second, the 
researcher would choose from news sources such as newspapers, radio, and television 
stories. If there are too many stories, the researcher might limit the material by the size of 
news outlet or medium. Third, the researcher specifies in advance that stories must have at 
least some percentage of the story dedicated to Hurricane Katrina. Fourth, the researcher 
reads, watches, and listens to the stories in the sample and evaluates each for pertinence to 
Hurricane Katrina. Finally, the researcher has a summary that indicates the percentage of 
stories that covered Hurricane Katrina. 
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C. CONTENT ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR THE SEMINAL PICKERING 
CASE IN THE LEXISNEXIS DATABASE 
Combining the LexisNexis database and the content analysis research method 
indicates no existing jurisprudence on the free-speech rights of homeland security job 
applicants. Four steps were taken for this content analysis. First, the question was 
established: Is there existing legal jurisprudence on the free-speech rights of homeland 
security job applicants? Second, the LexisNexis screening functions were used to isolate 
an appropriate body of cases likely related to public job applicants. Third, a criterion was 
established in advance: Did a court use the Pickering rule or any other jurisprudence to 
evaluate the free-speech rights of a public job applicant. Fourth, the resulting cases were 
reviewed to determine whether they related to public job applicants. 
1. Establishing the Question: Is There Legal Jurisprudence on the Free-
Speech Rights of Public Job Applicants? 
Content analysis seeks to answer this question: Is there jurisprudence on the free-
speech rights of public job applicants? As discussed in Chapter I, the Supreme Court 
established the modern rule on the free-speech rights of public employees in Pickering v. 
Board of Education. Any subsequent case considering free-speech rights of public job 
applicants would cite to Pickering as the lead case.213 Even courts that elected not to use 
the rule of Pickering and to establish a new rule would need to cite to Pickering when 
analyzing why it should be deviated from or disregarded.214 LexisNexis allows a search 
within Pickering’s progeny for any cases that considered the free-speech rights of public 
job applicants. 
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2. Establishing the Body of Material: Screening LexisNexis for 
Appropriate Cases 
Among state and federal courts, 5,877 have cited to Pickering since the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in 1968.215 According to LexisNexis, 1,866 of the courts viewed the rule of 
Pickering positively and followed it.216 Of these, 1,793 cases were tried in federal courts, 
which—because free speech is a federal right established in the Constitution—have the 
jurisdiction when a plaintiff sues to enforce that right.217 Of these, LexisNexis deems that 
491 courts gave Pickering serious depth of discussion, meaning they either “analyzed” or 
“discussed” the case.218 Table 4 shows the progression of screening from all the cases 
citing Pickering to those most appropriate for content analysis. 
Table 4. Screening of Pickering Cases for Content Analysis 
Category Screening Constraint Number of Cases 
Citation History Citing Pickering  5,877  
Analysis Positive/Followed Pickering  1,866  
Courts Federal Courts Only  1,793  
Depth of Discussion Analyzed or Discussed Pickering  491  
 
The 491 cases engaging in serious analysis of Pickering were the most likely cases 
to apply to a public job applicant. However, this pool was still too large for content analysis. 
Therefore, the LexisNexis keyword function was used to further narrow the pool.  
For this search, two keywords were used: “applicant” and “candidate.” Single 
keywords were used to ensure the search was encompassing (e.g., “job applicant” would 
result in fewer results but may have missed pertinent cases). Additional keywords (e.g., 
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“seeker”) were deemed unnecessary as they were less likely to produce pertinent results, 
and each additional keyword would have diminishing marginal returns in the search 
process. This keyword search resulted in 72 cases including the word “applicant” and 120 
cases including the word “candidate.”219 The combined 192 cases served as a manageable 
size for content analysis. 
3. Establishing the Characteristic: Use of a Rule to Evaluate Public Job 
Applicant Rights 
When reviewing these cases, the characteristic sought was whether the court used 
an established rule (Pickering) or created a rule to adjudicate a case involving the free-
speech rights of public job applicants. Case law generally follows an established pattern: 
describes the facts and issue, states the rule of law, applies the rule to the facts, and 
determines the conclusion.220 Therefore, the cases were reviewed to determine whether 
they related to the free-speech rights of public job applicants and, if so, what rule the court 
used. Importantly, for this content analysis, it did not matter whether the court ruled for the 
plaintiff (the person bringing the lawsuit); it only mattered whether the court used 
Pickering or another rule, which would indicate established jurisprudence on the free-
speech rights of public job applicants. 
4. Reviewing the Body of Material for the Characteristic: Reading the 
Cases 
The 192 cases were reviewed for their use of a rule regarding the free-speech rights 
of public job applicants. Only three cases had a possible relation to public job applicants. 
The vast majority of results were false positives—search results returning cases that 
extensively applied Pickering and included the word “applicant” or “candidate” but did not 
relate to a public job applicant for various reasons. 
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The most common false-positive was the use of the word “candidate” to describe a 
candidate for political office, for which the employee’s support was the free speech at issue, 
but the courts had considered the actions of incumbent employees, not job candidates. 
Another common false-positive was the use of the word “applicant” to describe an 
applicant for promotion. In these cases, courts engaged in a Pickering analysis, but this had 
little implication on the free-speech rights of employees who should have known their 
rights via a union or employee handbook. Other examples of using “applicant” included 
explanations of incumbent employees’ job descriptions as evaluating applicants for 
licenses or government benefits; those courts had not considered job applicants. Finally, 
courts often used “applicant” when quoting from other unrelated cases and not analyzing 
job applicants. Appendix A and Appendix B provide lists of all 192 cases and a brief note 
on how each case relates to the free-speech rights of public job applicants. 
The three cases that engaged in a Pickering analysis of public job applicants are 
reviewed here. One case relates to an applicant for a volunteer position, another relates to 
an applicant for a replacement job after losing an elected position, and the last relates to an 
applicant whose city conditionally hired him but then rescinded the job offer. In none of 
the cases did the court explicitly indicate job applicants were entitled to a Pickering 
analysis protecting their free-speech rights. 
In Morrison v. City of Reading, the court engaged in a Pickering analysis for a 
plaintiff who criticized her city’s mayor and was denied a volunteer position with city 
government.221 Morrison was a community civil-rights activist who, among other actions, 
publicly complained that the city’s administration was misusing federal housing funds.222 
Later, Morrison applied for a volunteer position with the city’s Human Relations 
Commission.223 The city denied her application, which Morrison believed was related to 
her public complaints, so Morrison sued the city.224 Before engaging in a Pickering 
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analysis, the court summarily stated that “prospective government employees and 
applicants for volunteer positions as well as persons already employed in government 
positions enjoy First Amendment protection.”225 To support this assertion, the court cited 
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case of Hyland v. Wonder.226 However, Hyland dealt 
with an incumbent volunteer; none of its facts relate to an applicant for a volunteer or paid 
position.227 Although the Morrison court indicated that applicants might have free-speech 
protections, it engaged in no analysis on the question, and the authority it cites does not 
address applicants. Therefore, Morrison does not establish jurisprudence on the free-speech 
rights of public job applicants.  
In De La Garza v. Brumby, the court engaged in a Pickering analysis for a plaintiff 
who applied to be a school safety officer after losing a reelection campaign for sheriff, but 
the court did not explicitly address the plaintiff as a job applicant.228 After Brumby ousted 
De La Garza in a campaign for county sheriff, De La Garza applied for a position as a 
school safety officer.229 Brumby rejected De La Garza’s application.230 De La Garza sued, 
claiming that Brumby had violated his right to free speech by taking adverse employment 
action against him by not hiring him because of his statements during the election, which 
should have been protected free speech.231 The court reviewed these facts and evaluated 
De La Garza’s claim using a Pickering analysis.232 However, the court did not explicitly 
address De La Garza’s rights as an applicant as distinct from an incumbent employee.233 
The court seemed to treat De La Garza as an incumbent because of the transitory nature of 
                                                 
225 Morrison, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16942, at *17. 
226 Morrison, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16942, at *17. 
227 Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129 (1992). 
228 De La Garza v. Brumby, No. 6:11-CV-37, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26675 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 
2013). 
229 De La Garza, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26675, at *3. 
230 De La Garza, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26675, at *4. 
231 De La Garza, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26675, at *5. 
232 De La Garza, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26675, at *10. 
233 De La Garza, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26675, at *12–16. 
45 
the attempted shift in position from the sheriff to a school safety officer.234 Because of this 
implicit, rather than explicit, treatment and the transitory application, De La Garza v. 
Brumby does not clearly establish a rule for the free-speech rights of public employment 
job applicants. 
In Delia v. Benton County, the court engaged in a Pickering analysis for a plaintiff 
whose employment offer was withdrawn.235 Delia contended that Benton County 
withdrew its employment offer because the county discovered he had sued his previous 
government employer.236 The court equivocated between the plaintiff’s status as a 
dischargeable employee and an applicant.237 For example, the court described its duty as 
having to evaluate the county’s “decision to discharge plaintiff or alternatively not to hire 
plaintiff.”238 The court seemed to want to dispose of the dispute regardless of the plaintiff’s 
employment status, stating there was “scant evidence of motivation” for Benton County to 
retaliate against Delia, regardless of his employment status.239 Although the court 
implicitly equated incumbents and applicants, it did not explicitly analyze the issue or 
endorse a view that applicants have free-speech protections.240 
These three cases indicate that courts may rely on Pickering to resolve free-speech 
disputes for job applicants seeking public positions but have not explicitly stated so. In 
each case, the plaintiff was not a pure applicant for a new job but had transitioned from 
elected employment to appointed employment, had volunteered, or had been in limbo after 
receiving a job offer. Moreover, in each case, the court only implied that applicants should 
receive a Pickering analysis. Although the direction is positive, there is no clearly 
established jurisprudence on the free-speech rights of homeland security job applicants. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
For many years, the lack of clear jurisprudence on the free-speech rights of 
homeland security job applicants was not a problem. Employers have always engaged in 
background checks of applicants, but before the internet, employers rarely concerned 
themselves with what an applicant may have said in a public forum. Now, in the age of 
social media, employers have a trove of public speech to use when evaluating an applicant. 
Courts have not yet specifically established the free-speech rights of public job applicants. 
The next chapter considers arguments that applicants should be entitled to free-speech 
rights similar to the Pickering standard for employees. 
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IV. LEGAL ARGUMENTS ON THE FREE-SPEECH RIGHTS OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY JOB APPLICANTS 
Legal research examines existing case law to extract broadly applicable rules for 
new but similar circumstances. As Richard Posner describes it, the process of legal research 
seeks to “rely on information that can be gleaned from previous cases and to emphasize 
the continuity between those cases and the new one.”241 This thesis uses the legal research 
method to answer a novel question of law: When homeland security employers screen the 
social media of job applicants, what are the free-speech rights of those applicants? This 
chapter first considers case law containing arguments that can be adapted to show SMS 
violates the free-speech rights of homeland security job applicants. Then, it considers 
counter-arguments from case law that indicate SMS does not violate the free-speech rights 
of homeland security job applicants. 
A. ARGUMENTS THAT SOCIAL MEDIA SCREENING INFRINGES ON 
THE FREE-SPEECH RIGHTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY JOB 
APPLICANTS 
This chapter considers three types of arguments that SMS infringes on the free-
speech rights of homeland security job applicants. First, it analyzes how the Pickering line 
of cases would apply to applicants. Second, it assesses how analogous cases—such as those 
considering loyalty oaths and the chilling effect of employee speech policies—would apply 
to applicants. Finally, it evaluates how various Supreme Court doctrines—syntheses of 
case law—would apply to the SMS of applicants. 
1. Applying the Pickering Rule to Homeland Security Job Applicants 
As discussed in Chapter I, the Supreme Court established the modern rule on the 
free-speech rights of public employees in Pickering v. Board of Education.242 After 
Pickering, the court added two threshold questions—discussed in the subsequent 
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paragraph—that must be satisfied before the Pickering balancing of interests is triggered, 
creating the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test.243 An obvious starting point for considering 
the free-speech rights of homeland security job applicants is to consider how this 
jurisprudence would apply to homeland security job applicants in lieu of incumbent 
government employees. 
The modern rule on the free-speech rights of public employees is a series of 
threshold questions and a balancing test. Per Connick, was the content of the speech related 
to a matter of public concern?244 Per Garcetti, was the person speaking as a private 
citizen?245 Finally, per Pickering, do the interests of speakers in exercising their right to 
free speech outweigh the interests of employers in efficient operations? The answers to the 
questions inform a balancing of the interests of a public employee “as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern” against the interest of the government “as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.”246 Only when all three questions are answered in the affirmative is the public 
employee’s speech protected by the First Amendment. 
In Connick, the Supreme Court established the first threshold question: Was the 
employee speaking on a matter of “public concern” such as school funding or stringency 
of airport screening?247 If so, the matter should be considered for further analysis; if not, 
the speech is unprotected.248 The court recognized the importance of employees as citizens 
contributing to public discussions on matters of “political, social, or other concern to the 
community.”249 But the court did not want to obligate future courts to the role of managing 
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disputes over employment matters such as work conditions or “ordinary dismissals from 
government service” because of employee performance.250 
Applying the Connick threshold test to homeland security job applicants indicates 
that they satisfy this threshold because, as applicants, they do not yet have employment 
concerns and, therefore, speak only with personal knowledge about matters of public 
concern. Homeland security job applicants who express their opinions do not yet have a 
basis in knowledge about the work conditions of incumbent employees. Courts would not 
be forced to manage disputes between applicants and public employers unless the 
employers did not hire applicants because of their speech, which would be the proper role 
of the courts. A counter-example is possible: an applicant speaking before being hired 
about the conditions of her potential employment. But even this might be construed as a 
matter of public concern, as such potential employment conditions would apply to all other 
applicants and possibly affect the experience of the public when receiving services from 
these employees. 
In Garcetti, the Supreme Court established a second threshold question: Was the 
employee speaking as a “private citizen”?251 If so, the matter should be considered for 
further analysis; if not, the speech is unprotected.252 In establishing this threshold question, 
the court contemplated two possible factors, rejected them, and finally settled on one 
determinative factor. The court considered whether the plaintiff’s speech was on the subject 
of his or her employment but determined this was inappropriate because employees have a 
personal basis in knowledge about government administration and should not be penalized 
for speaking about that basis.253 The court also considered whether the time and place of 
the speech are important but deemed they are not dispositive because citizens are equally 
likely to discuss issues at work as at home, and to disallow such speech would make public 
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workplaces speech-free zones.254 To establish its rule, the court decided that the 
“controlling factor” was whether the plaintiff’s speech was made pursuant to his or her 
employment duties.255 The Supreme Court justified this factor by noting that employers 
cannot control speech opportunities created by the Constitution—such as writing letters to 
the editor.256 Nevertheless, employers should be allowed to control speech opportunities 
created in the course of fulfilling a government objective—such as writing official 
memos.257 
Applying the Garcetti threshold test to homeland security job applicants indicates 
that they meet the threshold of speaking as private citizens because, by definition, they do 
not yet have employment duties. The Supreme Court’s concern was that government 
employers must be able to retain control over their employees. Besides requesting that 
applicants follow application instructions, potential employers should exercise little control 
over applicants who, like private citizens, should be free to speak on any subject. Another 
concern of the court was that the public would confuse protected speech—such as a letter 
to the editor—with unprotected speech—such as an official memo. Applicants, however, 
could not make pronouncements that anyone would consider official government 
messages. Finally, the court was concerned that courts would be thrust into managing 
disputes between employers and employees over workplace communications. As 
applicants are not yet employees, they cannot engage in official communications with 
future peers or superiors. 
In Pickering, the Supreme Court established a balancing test between the interests 
of public employees and public employers.258 The court recognized the interest of public 
employees in exercising their right to free speech, justifying this interest with the need for 
an informed public opinion, the need for free debate, and the need for citizens to speak 
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freely without fear of reprisal.259 The court also recognized the interest of public 
employers in the smooth delivery of public services, justifying this interest with the 
importance of discipline and harmony among employees, the need to build trust and loyalty 
between supervisors and subordinates, and the need for effectiveness in serving the 
public.260 
Applying the Pickering balancing test to homeland security job applicants in the 
abstract is challenging, but the justifications the court used serve as an analytical checklist. 
Regarding informed public opinion, applicants may be more informed than other citizens 
about certain issues because of due-diligence in their employment search. Regarding free 
debate, applicants should not have to forswear their right to debate various issues because 
they have applied for public employment. Regarding fear of reprisal, applicants should not 
have to fear adverse employment actions from the government after speaking. Regarding 
the employers’ need for discipline and harmony, applicants who may become discipline 
problems should be screened out via traditional means such as criminal record checks and 
drug tests. Regarding establishing trust and loyalty, employers can achieve this after 
applicants become employees; limiting applicant speech before they become employees 
stretches the justification too far. Regarding the need for efficiency, employers have many 
levers to pull—restricting free-speech rights should be the last option. 
Even if one analyzes the free-speech rights of homeland security job applicants as 
if they were already employees, the blended Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test indicates that 
those applicants should be entitled to the full free-speech rights of private citizens and not 
the more limited rights of incumbent employees. By definition, applicants do not yet have 
employment concerns, so their speech would be on a matter of public concern. Applicants 
are not yet employed, so they must be speaking as private citizens. Furthermore, the 
justifications for the Pickering balancing test argue that applicant speech should be 
protected. The government is not permitted to screen the social media of private citizens 
without probable cause because it would violate their free-speech rights. Applying the 
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Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test to homeland security job applicants indicates that 
applicants are sufficiently close to private citizens to deserve the same protection from 
SMS. 
2. Analogizing from Pre-employment Loyalty Oaths to Social Media 
Screening of Homeland Security Job Applicants 
During the Red Scare in the 1950s, citizens and politicians feared that communists 
were infiltrating all levels of the U.S. government.261 In response, some states instituted 
loyalty oaths as an employment requirement for all government positions, not merely 
sworn employees such as police officers and firefighters.262 These loyalty oaths required 
public job applicants to swear allegiance to the state employer and foreswear allegiance to 
the Communist Party or other groups thought to be undermining the government.263 In 
Elfbrandt v. Russell, the Supreme Court ruled such loyalty oaths violated the right to free 
speech.264 Arizona had passed a law that allowed prosecution of state employees who 
violated the oath by joining groups seeking to undermine the United States.265 A job 
applicant challenged the oath as violative of his free-speech rights.266 The court agreed, 
allowing oaths that barred participation in groups that engaged in violent acts but 
disallowing oaths that barred participation in groups that merely engaged in political 
activity.267 The court noted that such oaths might dissuade strong job candidates: “Public 
employees of character and integrity may well forgo their calling rather than risk 
prosecution” under such laws.268 
Social media screening of homeland security job applicants has the potential to be 
the loyalty oaths of today. Much as loyalty oaths threatened public job applicants with 
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penalties for joining non-violent political groups, SMS threatens public job applicants with 
the denial of possible employment based on what they do or do not say on social media. 
For example, if an applicant for a law enforcement position feels strongly about the Black 
Lives Matter group and joins the group on Facebook, will a police department view that 
online participation as contrasting with loyalty to the police department? Because concerns 
such as this example might cause applicants to forego their calling, SMS violates their free-
speech rights in the same way as loyalty oaths. 
3. Considering the “Chilling Effect” That Social Media Screening Could 
Have on Homeland Security Job Applicants 
Courts do not merely protect free-speech rights after specific plaintiffs have 
suffered a violation. Courts also proactively protect free-speech rights by striking down 
laws that may hinder speech before it is even made. In United States v. National Treasury 
Employees Union, the Supreme Court considered such a law and found it had a chilling 
effect on the potential speech of public employees.269 When Congress passed the Ethics 
Reform Act of 1989, it banned federal employees from receiving honorarium payments for 
speaking engagements or written articles.270 Before the rule went into effect, a group of 
employees sued to enforce their right to free speech.271 In evaluating their free-speech 
rights, the court noted it was not engaging in “post hoc [after the fact] analysis of one 
employee’s speech” but evaluating a “wholesale deterrent to a broad category of expression 
by a massive number of potential speakers.”272 The court used the Pickering framework 
for this evaluation but indicated that the government faced a heavy burden of proof that 
was greater for a “statutory restriction on expression” than it would be for “an isolated 
disciplinary action” because of the challenge in balancing as yet unspoken speech.273 The 
court recognized that the speech restriction would affect not only current employees but 
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also a “vast group of present and future employees” by affecting their compensation, which 
would indirectly “induce them to curtail their expression.”274 For these reasons, the court 
overruled the honorarium ban because it would “chill potential speech before it 
happens.”275 
Social media screening of homeland security job applicants has the potential to 
have the same speech-chilling effects that the Supreme Court ruled against in National 
Treasury Employees Union. Consistent with Pickering, the court considered the needs of 
employers and the value of employee and future-employee speech. But for wholesale 
regulations, the court tilted the scale by emphasizing the value of potential speech and 
deemphasizing the claimed needs of employer efficiency. SMS may be a deterrent to a 
massive number of potential speakers because job candidates who know or suspect that 
their potential employer will screen their social media may self-restrict their speech. 
Similar to the honorarium ban, SMS is broader than isolated disciplinary action against a 
certain employee’s speech; therefore, it should be evaluated against a higher burden of 
proof than isolated dispensary actions. Also, the court recognized the importance of 
protecting the free-speech rights of job applicants when it noted the potential impact of 
laws that affected future employees. The court was concerned that the threat of a monetary 
fine would chill their speech; SMS has the potential to deny applicants an entire career. 
4. Applying the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions to Social Media 
Screening 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that “government may not grant 
[or withhold] a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional 
right.”276 The doctrine is wide-ranging and can apply to any constitutional right, not only 
free speech.277 In 2013, the Supreme Court cited approvingly to this doctrine and provided 
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a series of examples.278 First, the court noted counties could not condition government-
provided medical care by requiring that patients live in the county for at least one year, 
foregoing their right to travel.279 Second, the court noted that municipalities could not 
condition land-zoning by requiring that owners grant rights-of-way to municipalities, 
foregoing their Fifth Amendment right to just compensation for government takings.280 
Finally, the court noted that state universities could not condition professorships by 
requiring that instructors refrain from critiquing schools, foregoing their right to free 
speech.281 In each case, the court noted that governments may not engage in quid pro quo 
bargaining with beneficiaries to pressure them to give up a constitutional right in exchange 
for a government benefit. 
Social media screening violates the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions by 
pressuring homeland security job applicants to forego their free-speech rights in exchange 
for jobs. Government employment qualifies as a government benefit; courts have even 
ruled that applicants placed on eligibility lists have a property interest in the potential 
employment.282 Free speech is a constitutional right.283 Although SMS is not an explicit 
quid pro quo, it implicitly pressures applicants to self-restrict their online speech. 
Applicants concerned about their potential employment may refrain from speaking on 
controversial topics or taking positions they anticipate their potential employer may not 
endorse. 
5. Applying the Doctrine of Vagueness to Social Media Screening 
The doctrine of vagueness holds that laws and regulations are unconstitutional 
when individuals cannot determine what they prohibit.284 A regulation governing speech 
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is vague when potential speakers cannot understand it, must “guess at its meaning,” and 
“differ as to its application.”285 The doctrine of vagueness is justified under two rationales. 
First, the doctrine invalidates laws that do not provide citizens with fair notice or warning 
about the laws’ application.286 For example, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that 
criminalized “treating contemptuously the flag of the United States” when a man was 
charged for wearing the flag as a patch on the seat of his jeans.287 The court ruled the 
statute was too vague for people to anticipate whether their actions would violate it.288 
Second, the doctrine invalidates vague laws because they may allow for “arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.”289 In the example of one constitutional scholar, “police who 
look charitably on a postgame victory celebration in the streets of a college town may not 
feel the same way about an antiwar demonstration.”290 
The doctrine of vagueness argues that SMS may violate the First Amendment rights 
of homeland security job applicants by leaving those applicants unsure of whether and how 
their speech is being evaluated. Regarding notice, even if agencies inform candidates they 
will be screening their social media, they may not give clear guidelines on what is and is 
not acceptable. In contrast to drug tests whereby candidates know the binary nature of the 
screening results, SMS guidelines would be ambiguous, if they exist at all. Regarding 
arbitrariness, social media present the possibility that the screeners prefer some social 
media activity to others. SMS is arbitrary in that one screener may look charitably on a 
candidate’s support for gun rights but may not feel the same way about another candidate’s 
support for abortion rights, or vice versa. 
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These arguments show that homeland security job applicants should be treated as 
private citizens and, therefore, not be subject to SMS as it is a form of free-speech 
restriction. Existing jurisprudence—the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test—defines the 
acceptable restrictions on incumbent public employees; applying that test to applicants 
indicates applicants should neither be restricted nor treated as if they were employees. 
When engaging with applicants as private citizens, the government cannot constitutionally 
demand loyalty, chill speech, engage in quid pro quo bargaining for benefits, or arbitrarily 
enforce free-speech standards. SMS can serve as a mechanism for all those unconstitutional 
actions and violate the free-speech rights of homeland security job applicants. 
B. ARGUMENTS THAT SOCIAL MEDIA SCREENING DOES NOT 
INFRINGE ON FREE SPEECH 
To fairly evaluate the idea that homeland security job applicants are entitled to the 
free-speech protections of private citizens, this section considers counter-arguments. First, 
it considers the precedent that found Pickering was not the appropriate analytical 
framework for a candidate for a public university training program, which is somewhat 
similar to government employment. Second, it considers the precedent that fear of one’s 
speech being chilled is not sufficient to create standing to sue to protect one’s free-speech 
rights. 
1. Pickering Is Not an Appropriate Framework for Analyzing 
Non-employees 
On at least one occasion, a plaintiff contended he was denied a job opportunity 
because of his speech and requested the court engage in a Pickering analysis, which the 
court deemed inapplicable. In Oyama v. University of Hawaii, a state school denied Oyama 
admission to a licensing program—and thus possible government employment.291 When 
Oyama was simultaneously a student in one program and seeking admission to another that 
would enable him to work as a public school teacher, he made inflammatory statements 
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about students with disabilities and the acceptability of pedophilia.292 Because of these 
statements, the school rejected his application to the licensing program.293 Oyama argued 
that the school violated his free-speech rights and urged the court to engage in a Pickering 
analysis.294 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized Oyama as a hybrid, as he was 
simultaneously a student and an applicant.295 Regarding his status as an applicant, the 
court refused to apply Pickering, holding it was inappropriate to “extend this doctrine to 
those who do not yet work for the government but may wish to do so.”296 The court denied 
this extension because it would have had the effect of limiting Oyama’s speech as if he was 
an employee, denying him the “freedom to test his ideas, critique professional conventions, 
and develop into a more mature professional than he would as a government employee.”297 
Instead, the court analyzed his claim using the certification doctrine, the concept that courts 
should grant “deference to certifying institutions” provided the institutions apply 
professional standards and not the personal preferences of their employees.298 The court 
endorsed the certification doctrine for narrow use with certifying entities, not adjudicating 
employers’ restrictions on applicant speech.299 
Oyama does not endorse limiting free speech for applicants for public employment; 
it merely endorses the certification doctrine for how public institutions evaluate the speech 
of applicants for state certifications. Oyama argued that Pickering was an appropriate 
framework for analyzing the free-speech rights of public job applicants. Though the court 
rejected this idea, the rejection does not indicate public job applicants are not entitled to 
free-speech rights. On the contrary, recall that the Pickering was established as the 
framework by which governments could acceptably limit the free speech of their 
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employees; it did not affect the expansive free-speech rights of non-employee citizens, 
including those applying for public employment. And the court’s own explanation of the 
certification doctrine reinforces the concerns of the vagueness doctrine—that it allows for 
selective arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, such as in a separate incident wherein 
a public university expelled a student seeking certification as a counselor because the 
student referred a gay client to another counselor.300  
2. Merely the Fear of Adverse Employment Action Is Insufficient for 
Standing to Sue 
Though the Supreme Court shows great respect for the concern that state action 
may chill speech, it has limited the concern with the requirement that a plaintiff show 
standing—that the plaintiff suffered an injury traceable to government action that can be 
redressed by a court. In Clapper v. Amnesty International, the Supreme Court rejected the 
idea that the fear of restriction of a First Amendment right grants standing to sue.301 After 
the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act in 2008, Amnesty 
International claimed that the potential of surveillance was so fearsome that it chilled its 
free speech.302 The court rejected this claim, ruling that Amnesty had not fulfilled the 
requirement of standing.303 The court noted that Amnesty International’s fear was not 
“fairly traceable” because it required a long chain of events: (1) that the government would 
seek to surveil non-U.S. persons with whom Amnesty International was communicating, 
(2) that the government would seek Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court authority, (3) 
that a judge would grant that authority, (4) that the government would succeed in 
intercepting communications, and (5) that Amnesty International would be on the 
particular call or e-mail with the targeted individual that the government intercepted.304 
Because there were so many speculative links in this chain, the court ruled that an 
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individual could not show standing merely from the “fear that, armed with the fruits of 
[agency surveillance], the agency might in the future take some other and additional action 
detrimental to that individual.”305 
Just because Amnesty International could not show standing does not mean that 
homeland security job applicants could not. Clapper is not an effective counter-argument 
because the chain of connection between homeland security job applicants and their 
employers is much shorter than in Clapper. Homeland security job applicants need not 
speculate about a series of possible events to fear that their speech may cause detrimental 
action. One study found that 80 percent of students anticipate SMS by potential 
employers.306 Moreover, applicants often communicate among themselves about 
application procedures, making their fear of possible consequences more legitimate than 
in Clapper. Through unofficial online chat boards, applicants spread rumors about the 
hiring practices of departments, including rumors of SMS. For example, on Officer.com, 
the New York regional sub-board of a law enforcement chat room, 29 of 50 posts were 
about law enforcement job opportunities and screening procedures, with interested 
applicants discussing concerns such as what prescription medications or psychological 
conditions might be disqualifying.307 These applicants are clearly fearful about failing 
screening procedures, so fearful that they are reaching out to strangers online for any 
information they can find. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Balancing the arguments for and against free-speech protections for homeland 
security job applicants indicates that applicants should be provided with the full protections 
of private citizens. Applying existing jurisprudence for incumbent public employees to 
homeland security job applicants suggests applicants should be treated as private citizens. 
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Analogous case law on free speech indicates that homeland security job applicants would 
suffer various forms of government pressure to self-restrict their speech. Furthermore, 
counter-arguments can be distinguished as not addressing the specific concerns of 
homeland security job applicants. 
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V. SOCIAL SCIENCE ARGUMENTS ON THE FREE SPEECH 
RIGHTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY JOB APPLICANTS 
When analyzing a novel question of law, legal research looks beyond existing case 
law for public policy justifications in areas such as ethics, economics, and sociology.308 
Social science disciplines offer arguments opposing the SMS of homeland security job 
applicants because it may be unethical, inefficient, and ineffective. Ethical analyses of 
employee health screening provide analogous arguments for SMS that suffer from counter-
arguments. Economic theories of market-wage and economic balancing indicate SMS may 
not recognize the costs thereof. Moreover, sociology offers explanations of how applicants 
engage in the management of their social media to make good impressions and how 
employers are attracted to applicants similar to themselves, risking groupthink. This 
chapter reviews arguments from social science disciplines and considers how they apply 
to the free-speech rights of homeland security job applicants. 
A. ETHICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR EVALUATING SOCIAL MEDIA 
SCREENING 
Public health experts wrestle with the ethics of screening applicants for unhealthy 
behaviors such as smoking and obesity. Ethical arguments justifying screening smokers 
and the obese can be divided into deontological (duty-based) and consequentialist (utility-
based) ethical frameworks. This section reviews those arguments, adapts them to SMS for 
homeland security job applicants, and presents counter-arguments that demonstrate SMS 
is not justified. 
1. Deontological (Duty-Based) Ethical Frameworks 
Deontological (duty-based) ethics focuses on the duty of actors and examines 
whether actions are “right or wrong in themselves, not by consideration of their 
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consequences.”309 Ethicists, for example, propose a duty-based argument that screening 
for smokers and the obese is justified because employers have a duty to hire employees 
who can serve as role models. Schmidt, Voigt, and Emanuel studied the ethics of screening 
smokers and found health-care organizations, in particular, argue that “employees must 
serve as role models for patients and that only nonsmokers can do so.”310 For example, the 
World Health Organization hires only non-smokers and defends the policy by “its 
commitment to tobacco control and the importance of ‘denormalizing’ tobacco use.”311 
Similarly, for obesity, medical ethicist Cynthia Jones argues there is a “moral duty to 
address health disparities because the required basic respect for all persons is violated by 
the presence of significant differences in health.”312 This moral duty justifies paternalism 
and pressure as “both morally acceptable and morally laudable” because there is an 
obligation for “legitimate government intervention if a health problem affects a vulnerable 
population.”313 In both cases, these justifications involve a duty-based argument: 
Screening for smokers and the obese is justified because employers must be role models 
for the public; the consequential suffering of the obese or smokers is not a consideration. 
Analogizing from these justifications illustrates arguments for the SMS of 
homeland security job applicants under a duty-based ethical framework. Homeland 
security employers have an obligation to screen the social media of job applicants because 
those individuals will serve as role models and should not be engaging in social media 
behavior of which the employer does not approve. Social media screening is ethical 
because it “denormalizes” unapproved speech by homeland security job applicants that 
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could eventually affect the employer’s operations. Paternalism and pressure to suppress 
speech are morally acceptable because homeland security employers must hire only those 
candidates whose speech aligns with that of the employer to ensure the employer’s mission 
is efficiently accomplished. This duty trumps any possible negative consequences for job 
applicants. 
The duty-based framework supporting SMS is vulnerable to numerous counter-
arguments. Homeland security employers mistake how they are viewed by their 
constituents if they argue in favor of SMS to screen for appropriate role models. Homeland 
security agencies are the role models, and implicitly pressuring applicants to self-restrict 
speech casts homeland security agencies as authoritarian. Homeland security employers 
also mistake their mission if they are seeking to “denormalize” certain speech—citizens 
look to agencies to provide homeland security, not to dictate an approved speech code. 
Paternalism and pressure to suppress speech elevate SMS to a core mission though 
homeland security agencies are not tasked with that duty. Finally, a duty-based framework 
does not absolve actors of evaluating the efficacy of the action they claim fulfills their duty. 
2. Consequentialist (Utility-Based) Ethical Frameworks 
Consequentialist (utility-based) ethics evaluates actions based on the results of the 
actions, typically seeking to maximize the greatest good for the greatest number of 
people.314 Ethicists also consider a utility-based argument that employer screening for 
smokers and the obese is justified because smoking and obesity are personal choices that 
impose unjustified costs on a broader societal group. Health care ethicists focus on the 
costs of smoking and obesity: an increased health insurance expense, higher absenteeism, 
and lower productivity.315 Regarding smoking, Schmidt, Voigt, and Emanuel explain that 
employers feel employees “must take personal responsibility for actions that impose 
financial or other burdens on employers or fellow employees.”316 Similarly, regarding 
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obesity, employers believe “that, unlike race or gender, body weight is not an immutable 
characteristic.”317 Once employers conclude that smoking and obesity are choices, they 
justify discriminating “against the overweight ‘as a matter of economics’” because of the 
perceived increased costs.318 These justifications make a utility-based argument: 
Screening for smoking and obesity may impose burdens on some individuals, but those 
burdens are outweighed by the broader reduction in health insurance expenses, 
absenteeism, and lost productivity, which impact many others. 
Analogizing from these arguments offers a defense for the SMS of homeland 
security job applicants under a utility-based ethical framework. Homeland security 
employers view controversial and inflammatory speech by applicants as costly because it 
may hurt the reputation of the agency. The private sector recognizes the cost of 
inflammatory social media by employees by offering insurance against it. Risk and 
Insurance magazine has published articles such as “How Disgruntled Employees Tarnish 
Your Social Media Branding and Reputation,” and attorneys have written articles such as 
“Social Media Users, R U Insurable?”319 Homeland security agencies are increasingly 
aware of the need to use social media “to manage the reputation of the organization” and 
to “engage in community outreach,” but allowing the risk of inflammatory social media 
speech by job applicants runs counter to that effort.320 In a utilitarian ethical framework, 
although SMS may negatively affect the freedom of some applicants, the preservation of 
the reputation of homeland security agencies is more valuable. 
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This utility-based argument for SMS is vulnerable to several counter-arguments. 
First, proponents of SMS compare a certain negative—the deprivation of applicants’ free-
speech rights if employers decline to hire based on SMS—against a possible positive—
preventing a social media scandal that may reflect poorly on a government agency. Second, 
although employers always want more information about job candidates, the 
effectiveness—and therefore utility—of SMS is still uncertain.321 Thus far, researchers 
have shown a link only between negative online behavior and some personality traits; they 
have not shown a link to counter-productive work behavior.322 Third, homeland security 
agencies that engage in SMS to protect their reputation are neglecting to recognize they 
may be harming their reputation in the process. For example, applicants told after SMS by 
a prospective employer viewed the employer less favorably and were more likely to sue 
the employer.323 
B. ECONOMIC FRAMEWORKS FOR EVALUATING SOCIAL MEDIA 
SCREENING 
Economic perspectives on free-speech rights of homeland security employees and 
job applicants focus on the trade-offs among the public, employers, and employees. First, 
the market-wage theory of employment considers the exchange between employers and 
employees of compensation for temporarily foregone rights. Second, an economic cost–
benefit framework attempts to quantify the value of the components of speech and 
regulation. 
1. The Market-Wage Theory of Employment 
Market-wage theory is one way through which economists attempt to understand 
the negotiations between employers and potential employees. Market-wage theory holds 
that when an “employer and a worker agree on a job, a wage, and working conditions, the 
party giving up rights—typically the employee—is (in theory) compensated for rights 
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foregone,” such as the right to speak freely.324 When completed, this agreement forms an 
implied contract.325 Obviously, applicants are not yet under contract. However, extending 
the market-wage theory to applicants suggests an argument supporting SMS: Although 
applicants have not yet received compensation in exchange for their forgone rights, they 
may place option-value on the possibility of a job and be willing to acquiesce to SMS in 
exchange. 
Social media screening cannot be justified by market-wage theory because 
applicants have not agreed to forego rights. Relative to other types of contracts, 
employment is more accurately governed by norms captured in relational contracts—
implied terms based on the parties’ relationship with each other—instead of written 
transactional contracts.326 A market-wage theory attempting to justify SMS fails because 
applicants have had little to no time to develop a relationship with a prospective employer. 
Without a relationship, there is no opportunity to develop the implied terms that cover 
relational contracts. Without these terms, the market-wage justification becomes one-
sided: Employers have decided that the possibility of compensation justifies SMS, but 
applicants have had no opportunity to confirm.  
2. The Economic Cost–Benefit of Regulating Free Speech 
Richard Posner, widely considered one of the founders of the field of law and 
economics, developed an economic framework for evaluating free speech.327 Posner 
proposed a formula arguing that restricting speech is economically justified when the value 
of the suppressed speech is less than the cost of suppression: 
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V + E < P x L/(1+i)n 
• V = social value lost if the speech is restricted 
• E = error: the legal costs of determining the social value of the 
speech 
• P = probability that suppressing the speech will cause a social cost 
• L = magnitude of the social cost if the speech is allowed 
• i = interest rate 
• n = number of years until the social cost occurs.328 
Posner elaborates on each variable. V is an estimate of the value lost by society if 
the government restricts the speech, which is determined by the type and amount of the 
speech.329 Posner does not place numerical values on different types of speech but points 
out that society values some forms of speech—such as political speech—more than 
others—such as obscenities.330 E is an estimate of the legal costs necessary to “distinguish 
the information that society desires to suppress from valuable information.”331 P 
recognizes that resultant social costs of allowed speech are not guaranteed but only 
possible.332 L attempts to estimate the magnitude of the possible social cost if the speech 
is allowed.333 The variables i and n acknowledge that any possible social cost that occurs 
in the future must be discounted to the present value for a fair comparison.334 
Posner uses several examples to illustrate his framework by indicating the relative 
magnitude of the variables. As an example of political speech, Posner considers the case 
of National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, wherein a group of Neo-Nazis 
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sought government permission to parade through a predominantly Jewish 
neighborhood.335 Here, V (social value) is low; even allowing for some value in the Nazis’ 
political position, the communicative effects on a neighborhood of Jews would be low.336 
Also, E (error cost) is low, concluding the value of V is uncomplicated.337 However, P 
(probability of social cost) is high; such a parade is likely to create tension.338 L (magnitude 
of social cost) is also high; such tension could cause violence and rioting.339 Finally, there 
is little discount for the future timeframe of the costs; unlike a written manifesto that might 
cause unrest in the distant future, such a parade could cause harm almost immediately.340 
Because the present value is less than the possible future risk, Posner’s formula indicates 
that restricting the parade is justified. 
Posner also applies his formula to several special situations, including the free-
speech rights of public employees. Posner theorizes that V (social value) is low because 
“very few of them either want to express themselves publicly on political questions or 
could attract any significant audience if they did.”341 However, he admits that V could also 
be high because public employees have a unique perspective on government operations.342 
He finds the balancing difficult as P (probability of social cost) and L (magnitude of social 
cost) are also high because of the difficulty in “formulating and executing coherent 
government policies” to manage employee speech.343 On balance, Posner seems to find 
employee speech worth protecting if it is “self-expressive.”344 
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Applying the Posner framework to the SMS of homeland security job applicants 
indicates that such screening is costlier than the supposed benefits. Because homeland 
security job applicants have researched their chosen field, they have more information than 
the average citizen, increasing the measure of V (social value). In contrast to the time when 
Posner wrote that individuals could not attract “any significant audience,” applicants now 
have new media on which to attract millions of listeners: social media. The value for E 
(error cost) is high; homeland security employers would have to engage human-resource 
offices and possibly courts to evaluate questionable social media posts of applicants. P 
(probability of social cost) is low; few applicant social media posts are harmful to the 
public. For example, Facebook reports it discovered 2.4 million pieces of hate speech in 
the first quarter of 2018; among a base of 2.2 billion users, at most, 0.11 percent of users 
created hate speech.345 L (magnitude of social cost) is low; although there have been riots 
and violence over perceived racial injustice by police, such unrest was based on the actions 
of incumbent officers, not the speech of applicants. Finally, the discount for the future 
timeframe of possible social cost is high; even if a social media post could cause unrest, it 
would be after the applicant was hired and after it was discovered online. 
C. SOCIOLOGICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR EVALUATING SOCIAL MEDIA 
SCREENING 
Sociologists enjoy a rich mine of data for analysis in the internet and social media 
world. They have identified two issues related particularly to SMS and homeland security. 
First, applicants may be tempted to manage their social media to reflect the perceived 
preferences of potential employers. Second, SMS may lead to groupthink by homeland 
security agencies, which has been identified as particularly risky in this arena. 
1. Applicants May Engage in Impression Management When Applying 
for Homeland Security Jobs 
You never get a second chance to make a first impression. Job applicants know this 
and typically manage their social media profiles accordingly, engaging in what sociologists 
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have termed “impression management.”346 Impression management occurs when 
“individuals attempt to control the impressions others form of them.”347 Researchers have 
known of this phenomenon since the 1980s, but the creation of online social media has 
changed the means and motivations by which people seek to manage the impressions of 
others. Previously, impressions were limited to word of mouth, resume padding, and the 
names of references. Now, candidates can design “idealized versions of themselves” by 
creating “highly socially desirable identities.”348 
Social media users have three general tactics for impression management; each has 
implications for their free speech. First, applicants can omit information by “purposely not 
including information that could potentially hurt the impression.”349 For example, an 
applicant may choose to not include their race in a demography section. Second, applicants 
can “distance themselves from members of their network whose posts can damage their 
impression.”350 For example, an applicant may disengage from a political group about 
whom they are passionate out of concern that the group is too controversial for a potential 
employer. Third, applicants may use strict privacy settings to limit viewership, as social 
media users “believe they have a right to privacy with what they post online and take full 
advantage of privacy settings.”351 However, this creates a catch-22 for users: they feel 
strongly about an issue and want to speak out about it, but setting stringent privacy settings 
ensures few people can hear them. 
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The temptation of impression management combines with the SMS of homeland 
security job applicants to create the risk of stifling speech. Applicants may refrain from 
speaking on an issue about which they are passionate because they are concerned about the 
impression their position may make on a potential employer, or applicants may endorse 
certain positions about which they are neutral or negative to engender positive feelings in 
their potential employer. This dynamic is compounded by people being “more likely to 
engage in impression management when they perceive their image to be public.”352 Note 
that this dynamic occurs regardless of whether the employer is actually engaging in SMS; 
the specter of potential screening is enough to affect the speech of the applicant. 
2. Homeland Security Employers May Subconsciously Select People 
Similar to Themselves, Risking Groupthink 
Sociologists have studied the proclivity of individuals to favorably evaluate others 
similar to themselves, leading to positive selection bias and possible groupthink. 
Demographic similarity theory “draws upon the Similarity-Attraction paradigm (and 
Social Identity Theory), maintaining that managers observe key personal attributes and 
attitudes expressed by applicants and [ascribe] positive characteristics to individuals whom 
they view as similar to themselves.”353 Wade and Roth tested this theory by establishing 
fake social media accounts and posting about a political issue.354 Then, Wade and Roth 
gathered human-resource professionals, determined their positions on the political issue, 
and asked them to evaluate the fake profiles.355 Wade and Roth found a statistically 
significant relationship between (1) the similarity between the applicants and the human-
resource professional on the political issue and (2) the evaluations that the human-resource 
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professionals gave the applicants.356 This result indicates that demographic similarity 
theory is active in SMS.357 
Demographic similarity theory indicates homeland security employers risk 
developing a culture of groupthink when using SMS. One of the most important conditions 
encouraging groupthink is “homogeneity of group members’ social backgrounds and 
ideology.”358 James Ricciuti studied groupthink during homeland security–related 
incidents, including the Waco Branch Davidian raid, the Boston Marathon bomber 
manhunt, and the Brown standoff wherein a family claimed that the federal income tax was 
illegal and challenged federal marshals who tried to remove them from their property.359 
Ricciuti determined that groupthink in the homeland security enterprise risks several 
negatives: insulated leadership, belief in one’s own morality, closed-mindedness, and self-
fulfilling pressure to conform.360 
The risk of groupthink, when combined with a broader perspective on free speech, 
has implications for homeland security employers. Although it is common to conceive of 
free-speech rights protecting speakers, legal theory holds that the First Amendment also 
protects listeners.361 For example, when Congress required that libraries establish stringent 
internet-blocking policies on their public computers, the Supreme Court considered the 
rights of the listeners under the First Amendment.362 Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, 
noted the law imposes a burden on listeners—“library patrons seeking legitimate Internet 
materials”—because it “directly restricts the public’s receipt of information.”363 This 
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“right to receive information” is what constitutional law scholar Alexander Meiklejohn was 
describing when he stated, “What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that 
everything worth saying shall be said.”364 Although counter-intuitive, homeland security 
employers who engage in SMS risk violating the free-speech rights of themselves as well 
as listeners. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Social science disciplines such as ethics, economics, and sociology contribute 
helpful frameworks that can be adapted to consider the free-speech rights of homeland 
security job applicants. Ethical arguments for SMS are countered by the homeland security 
employers’ responsibility to serve as role models and to consider the efficiency of SMS in 
a larger context. Economic theories indicate the lack of an opportunity for applicants to 
develop a contractual employer–applicant relationship, and the factors in a cost–benefit 
formula argue against regulating applicant speech. Furthermore, sociological research 
indicates that applicants may alter their social media profiles to fulfill perceived employer 
desires and that homeland security employers risk groupthink by unconsciously selecting 
applicants whose social-media profiles match their views. 
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VI. ANALYSIS OF POLICY AND GUIDANCE ON SCREENING 
THE SOCIAL MEDIA OF HOMELAND SECURITY JOB 
APPLICANTS 
Although many homeland security employers engage in SMS of applicants, few 
publish their policies. Published policies allow for analysis of how homeland security 
employers engage in SMS and what standards they use for acceptable speech. Research for 
this thesis uncovered two documents useful for such an analysis. The Washington, D.C., 
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) published its SMS policy for applicants, and the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) published guidance for police 
departments on how to appropriately engage in SMS.365 This chapter describes both 
documents and analyzes them for positive and negative implications for the free-speech 
rights of homeland security job applicants by linking these implications to the legal and 
social science arguments described in previous chapters. 
A. WASHINGTON, D.C., METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 
SOCIAL MEDIA SCREENING POLICY 
The MPD established its SMS policy for applicants in its 2016 Special Order 
“Social Media Checks for Background Investigations.”366 Although publicly available via 
internet search, the MPD policy is an internal directive instructing recruitment staff and is 
not part of the recruitment information package provided to applicants.367 Analysis of the 
policy reveals implications for protecting and weakening the free-speech rights of 
homeland security job applicants. 
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1. Policy Description 
The MPD emphasizes the goals of protecting the department, treating applicants 
fairly, and preventing discrimination against applicants. First, the policy notes the legal 
risks for employers who do and do not engage in SMS—those that risk discriminating 
against applicants and those that do not risk civil judgments for negligent hiring if 
unprofessional applicants are hired and engage in misconduct.368 The policy recognizes 
these risks and seeks to “mitigate these risks to the greatest degree possible.”369 Second, 
the policy seeks fairness for applicants by requiring that social media checks be “conducted 
in a consistent and equitable manner.”370 Finally, the policy aims to protect the legal rights 
of applicants and “ensure that the checks do not discriminate against applicants or violate 
their privacy.”371 With these purposes in mind, the policy includes three practical sections 
on definitions, regulations, and procedures.372 
First, the MPD defines what information can be screened, by whom, and for what 
purpose. Applicants subject to SMS include active members, reserve members, and 
civilians.373 Social media are defined as electronic communications in online communities 
where users “share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content.”374 
Information is broadly defined as anything accessible to the general public.375 Derogatory 
information has its own definition: “Any information [that], if credited to a member of the 
MPD, would bring discredit upon the Department.”376 The policy later provides examples 
of derogatory information as “hate speech, derogatory postings and/or pictures.”377 
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Second, the MPD establishes regulations for its in-house background investigators. 
The policy requires that background investigators keep any discovered information 
confidential.378 The policy prohibits investigators from disqualifying an applicant based 
solely on the discovery of derogatory information.379 Moreover, the policy bars 
investigators from requesting passwords or requiring that applicants log in to accounts in 
their presence.380 
Third, the MPD’s procedures provide the steps and requirements for properly 
checking an applicant’s social media. The policy requires the department to notify 
applicants of the SMS via recruiting materials and to obtain signed waivers acquiescing to 
the screening.381 This waiver requires applicants to list their social media accounts, note 
any possibly derogatory material, and explain possibly derogatory material in advance.382 
The policy lists several specific social media sites that investigators should check and 
allows for additional internet searches, provided that all applicants are subjected to the 
same examination.383 If an investigator discovers any derogatory information, he must 
forward it to the applicant, who has an opportunity to explain it in writing.384 
2. Policy Implications Protecting the Free-Speech Rights of Applicants 
The MPD’s policy has numerous positive implications for protecting the free-
speech rights of homeland security job applicants. First, in general, homeland security job 
applicants are often uncertain whether and how homeland security employers are engaging 
in SMS. Although the MPD policy may still chill the speech of some applicants, at least 
they are made aware of the policy. Second, the MPD acknowledges that applicants have 
rights, including the right to privacy. Although the MPD does not explicitly note the right 
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to free speech, free speech and the right to privacy arguably are intertwined in the concept 
of “privacy of thought”—that privacy is necessary to develop ideas before they can be 
voiced. The MPD’s recognition of the right to privacy of thought indicates it may be open 
to recognizing applicants’ right to free speech.385 Third, the MPD recognizes the 
importance of social media as a form of speech. The MPD does not dismiss social media 
as merely an avenue to post vacation photos and relationship statuses but notes that social 
media are used to share “ideas.” Fourth, the MPD offers applicants an opportunity to 
explain potentially disqualifying information. This is the employment application version 
of Justice Brandeis’s maxim that the solution to disfavored speech is “more speech, not 
enforced silence.”386 
3. Policy Implications Infringing on the Free-Speech Rights of 
Applicants 
The MPD’s policy also includes aspects that may infringe on the free-speech rights 
of homeland security job applicants. Although the policy allows applicants to note 
potentially derogatory information before the SMS, some applicants may choose to simply 
delete such information, engage in impression management as described in Chapter IV, or 
otherwise effectively limit their speech. By setting a list of social media sites that will be 
surveyed, the policy may lead applicants to wrongly believe that other sites are not 
surveyed for publicly available information even though internet searches of candidates are 
permitted. Finally, the MPD’s multiple efforts to inform applicants that their social media 
will be screened may serve to “send a message” to applicants that they should curtail their 
speech if they want to work in the MPD.  
The MPD policy’s most negative implication for free speech is its guidance on what 
qualifies as derogatory. Its definition of derogatory as information that “would bring 
discredit upon the Department” is subjective, and its list of examples is circular, using 
derogatory to define derogatory. This lack of clarity may lead applicants to speculate as to 
                                                 
385 Ken Gormley, “One Hundred Years of Privacy,” Wisconsin Law Review 5 (January 1992): 1381, 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/privacy/Gormley--100%20Years%20of%20Privacy.htm. 
386 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1926). 
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what speech is acceptable to the MPD. As noted in the discussion of policies that may chill 
speech in Chapter III, homeland security job applicants exhibit fear of unknown screening 
procedures, casting about on internet chat boards for clarity on what behavior may 
disqualify them from employment. Also, the MPD’s weak definition may violate the 
Supreme Court’s doctrine of vagueness. The doctrine of vagueness holds that laws violate 
the First Amendment when citizens have to guess at their meaning. In the absence of clear 
guidelines from the MPD on what qualifies as disqualifying speech, applicants may simply 
self-restrict speech. Finally, the MPD’s definition fails the challenge of the Garcetti test. 
Garcetti protects speech when employees speak as private citizens. The MPD’s policy for 
applicants is concerned that derogatory information might be “credited to a member of the 
department,” implicitly acknowledging that homeland security agencies are judging 
applicants as if they were already agency members. Until they are hired, applicants remain 
private citizens and should be entitled to unencumbered free-speech rights. 
B. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE GUIDANCE 
ON DESIGNING SOCIAL MEDIA SCREENING POLICIES 
The IACP created guidance for homeland security employers on SMS in its 2010 
document Developing a Cybervetting Strategy for Law Enforcement.387 The IACP 
developed this guidance by reviewing existing literature and case law, interviewing 
subject-matter experts, and presenting proposals to 16 focus groups of law enforcement 
professionals for evaluation.388 The result was recommendations on SMS with a 
description of how each recommendation was developed. Aspects of these 
recommendations either protect or weaken the free-speech rights of homeland security job 
applicants. 
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1. Guidance Description 
The IACP guidance establishes goals and practices to achieve them. The IACP 
indicates that SMS policies should be consistent in scope and application.389 Policies 
should be applied consistently, periodically reviewed by management, approved by legal 
counsel, and “made available to the public.”390 Policies should fulfill the purposes of 
evaluating trustworthiness, estimating future responsible behavior, and ensuring “the 
individual has behaved in a manner consistent with law enforcement mores.”391 The IACP 
divides its guidance into three sections: notice, search practices, and adjudication.392 
First, the IACP emphasizes the importance of providing notice to applicants that 
their social media may be screened and gaining consent from applicants prior to conducting 
SMS. Despite noting that law enforcement agencies “are not legally required to inform job 
applicants . . . about employment-related cybervetting unless those searches are performed 
by a third party,” the IACP strongly encourages agencies to provide notice to respect 
applicants’ privacy and “allow job applicants to make informed decisions.”393 The IACP 
advises that employers request written consent from candidates so they are aware that 
recruitment staff will survey their social media and related internet search results.394 Also, 
candidates should be afforded the chance to explain any potentially concerning 
information.395 The IACP suggests that employers “review online information about these 
individuals available on websites, where a subject’s password is required to view 
content.”396 Finally, employers should notify applicants that failure to provide consent 
may “impact their employment status.”397 
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Second, the IACP recognizes that internet searches of candidates are an obvious 
way to engage in a background investigation. The IACP cautions that investigators must 
be trained to seek relevant information, redact information that may lead departments to 
discriminate against certain kinds of applicants, and maintain confidentiality.398 The IACP 
has frowned on one agency using college interns because they were more familiar with the 
internet than upper management.399 The IACP recommends that agencies request e-mail 
addresses, screen-names, and blogs where applicants contribute.400 Although agencies 
should not ask for passwords, they can request that applicants log in to “password-protected 
websites so that the recruiter or background investigator can review their profiles, blogs, 
or other online forums.”401 The IACP specifically expresses concern about free-speech 
rights, including a full review of the applicable case law, but only in the context of 
incumbent employees, not applicants.402 The IACP endorses a policy of prohibiting 
employees from disseminating “any material that brings discredit . . . to the agency,” but 
again, this applies only to incumbent employees; the IACP does not offer model language 
for applicants.403 
Third, the IACP issues recommendations for adjudication, including determining 
when a candidate should be eliminated from consideration. The IACP notes that any 
adjudication should be preceded by authentication—determining that the information is 
correctly associated with the applicant (e.g., the John Smith posting was made by the actual 
John Smith applying for the job).404 Once authenticated, the IACP reminds agencies that 
social media information should be used just like other background information for 
adjudication.405 Furthermore, the IACP notes that if agencies use a third-party firm to 
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engage in SMS, they are obligated by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act to provide the 
applicant with any information that affects the hiring decision.406 
2. Guidance Implications Protecting the Free-Speech Rights of 
Applicants 
The IACP guidance ensures that applicants are aware of SMS and treated equally. 
By emphasizing the importance of notice, the IACP ensures that applicants are aware if 
agencies screen their social media. By recognizing the importance of applicants’ privacy—
and presumably the privacy necessary to speak among friends about important ideas—the 
IACP acknowledges that applicants have distinct rights from incumbent employees, but 
does little more. The IACP also appropriately notes the importance that SMS be conducted 
by officially trained staff to minimize the risk of infringement on applicants’ rights. 
Although focusing on incumbents, the IACP acknowledges that SMS impacts the right to 
free speech. Finally, the IACP guidelines for authentication and adjudication ensure that 
applicants are not wrongly accused of policy violations and that applicants are treated 
equally based on established criteria. 
3. Guidance Implications Infringing on the Free-Speech Rights of 
Applicants 
The IACP’s procedural guidance does little to assuage applicants of the fear that 
their speech may be used against them, leaving applicants to self-restrict speech. Regarding 
notice, the IACP makes a veiled threat by suggesting that applicants should make 
“informed decisions” about their social media, or it may “impact their employment status.” 
The IACP’s suggestion that agencies should be allowed to view applicants’ password-
protected social media accounts after the applicant has logged in implies that applicants 
should self-restrict speech even among a closed group of online friends. The IACP neglects 
to define what may “bring discredit” to an agency, allowing broad concern among 
applicants on what speech may disqualify them for employment and, therefore, 
encouraging applicants to self-restrict speech. Although noting that SMS should be done 
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according to “established criteria,” the IACP falls short of the obvious recommendation 
that such criteria be written and, therefore, dodges the question of whether such criteria 
should be published to applicants.  
Besides the procedural aspects of the IACP guidance that may infringe on the free-
speech rights of applicants, the spirit of the guidance is problematic. The IACP’s goal that 
screening should eliminate candidates who are not “consistent with law enforcement 
mores” implies that agencies should deny employment based on candidate speech that does 
not fit the norms of the law enforcement community. Such an implied requirement is 
reminiscent of the “loyalty oaths” described in Chapter III. The Supreme Court evaluated 
loyalty oaths and ruled they violate the First Amendment because they might dissuade 
quality applicants who fear retaliation for breaching such oaths. Similarly, the IACP’s goal 
of finding applicants who are consistent with law enforcement mores may dissuade those 
who have cultural or political views inconsistent with existing law enforcement culture, 
which sociologists have described as promoting an “us versus them” attitude, proving 
masculinity, and resisting change.407 Also, as discussed in Chapter IV, enforcing cultural 
homogeneity risks a groupthink environment and its associated negatives for the 
organization, such as insulated leadership and closed-mindedness. The IACP’s goal of 
maintaining existing law enforcement mores may stifle the free speech of candidates who 
could contribute original thoughts to counteract such groupthink.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The MPD policy and the IACP guidance provide insight into how some homeland 
security employers are or should be thinking about the SMS of job applicants. Both 
documents take some steps toward protecting free-speech rights for homeland security job 
applicants, such as making efforts at informing applicants of the SMS process, giving 
applicants opportunities to explain potentially problematic speech, and ensuring fair 
adjudication once information the agency deems problematic is found. However, many 
aspects of the documents increase the risks to applicant free speech: the documents are 
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vague as to what types of speech are unacceptable, they encourage applicants to self-restrict 
speech, and they seek to perpetuate the existing law enforcement culture. On balance, even 
when attempting to carefully describe best practices for SMS, these documents imply 
diminished free- speech rights for homeland security job applicants.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This thesis sought to determine the free-speech rights of homeland security job 
applicants when employers screen their social media and whether existing policies and 
guidance support or infringe on those free-speech rights. To answer these questions, it 
considered legal arguments on the free-speech rights of applicants, social science 
arguments on free-speech rights of applicants, and two public documents offering protocols 
and guidance for screening applicants’ social media.  
Legal arguments around the SMS of homeland security job applicants favor treating 
applicants as private citizens because justifications for diminished protections are 
nonsensical when applied to applicants. For example, employers may be justified in 
restricting the speech of employees because the public may confuse an employee’s official 
speech representing the agency with an individual’s private speech; no listener would 
mistake an applicant’s speech as representing the government. Social science arguments 
lean toward treating applicants as private citizens because the frameworks that justify 
restricting employee speech are not compelling when applied to applicants. For example, 
an economic cost–benefit analysis favors allowing applicant speech as it would most likely 
have a value greater than the cost of restricting it. Finally, the publicly available policies 
and guidance indicate employers may be underestimating how their policies send a 
message to applicants that they should self-restrict speech to improve their chances of 
employment. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
If one accepts that homeland security job applicants should be entitled to free-
speech protections, what recommendations support such a goal? This thesis recommends 
(1) positive steps—actions homeland security employers can take to prevent infringing on 
applicants’ rights—and (2) preventive steps—actions homeland security employers should 
avoid to prevent interference with applicants’ rights. 
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1. Positive Steps 
Homeland security employers can take affirmative steps to give job applicants a 
better understanding of the SMS process and put applicants at ease that their free-speech 
rights are not in jeopardy. First, in the style of the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police 
Department, homeland security employers should ensure applicants are notified of the 
screening process and openly publish their internal protocols for the SMS of applicants. 
Applicants already anticipate that employers may be screening their social media and may 
self-restrict speech for fear it may affect their employment prospects. Providing applicants 
with clear notice at least removes the fear of the unknown for the applicant. By publishing 
the internal protocols for applicants, homeland security employers show applicants they 
are distinct from incumbent employees and warrant their own policy, and publishing the 
policy will assuage the fears of applicants regarding disparate treatment and the breadth of 
the screening. 
Second, homeland security employers should publish a database of social media 
speech they have used to disqualify applicants. Lacking clear guidance or examples, 
applicants are left unsure of what speech may be disqualifying. Such a database would be 
analogous to pre-employment drug-use policies published by certain homeland security 
employers, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s policy that specifies acceptable 
timeframes before employment for the use of marijuana versus other illegal drugs.408 By 
stripping the social media posts of personally identifying information, homeland security 
employers would protect the privacy of the disqualified applicants. But, by indicating what 
social media posts are unacceptable, homeland security employers would reassure 
applicants that most speech is protected. Social media employers could seed such a 
database with example posts based on news or experience and then add to the database as 
they find new examples during the actual screening of applicants. If an independent entity 
manages such a database, the experiences of many agencies could be centralized and the 
burden of maintaining it shared. For example, the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
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Centers (FLETC) facilitate a “Lessons Learned Work Group” that consolidates 
experiences, anonymizes them, and disseminates them among the group for everyone’s 
benefit.409 Similarly, FLETC could anonymize social media posts that recruitment officers 
find disqualifying and share them with other agencies and applicants.  
2. Preventative Steps  
Homeland security employers can also take preventative steps to ensure that the 
free-speech rights of applicants are protected. These steps include carefully wording their 
recruitment materials to avoid implying SMS will serve as enforcement of a speech code 
and resisting the temptation to evaluate applicant social media activity as if it were 
incumbent employee social media activity. 
Employers should avoid including language in their recruiting materials and notice 
of social media documents that implies applicants will be held to a speech code. Veiled 
threat language—such as that found in the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
guidance, suggesting applicants should make “informed decisions” about their social 
media—makes applicants more likely to self-restrict speech. Employers should reconsider 
language that implies applicants should adhere to the homeland security enterprise’s 
existing culture and assure applicants that SMS is done in the spirit of preserving free 
speech.  
Employers should avoid evaluating applicant speech by the same standard used to 
evaluate the speech of incumbent employees. Employers may want to use their experience 
with employees’ social media policy breaches as guideposts for determining when 
applicant social media speech is disqualifying in an employment background check. 
However, employers should recognize that applicants are not yet employees and should 
not yet be held to the same standard. 
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B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND FUTURE LEGAL 
ACTION 
The contours of applicant free-speech rights can be more fully determined by future 
research and legal action. Future research could consider other rights of applicants. For 
example, are applicants entitled to due-process rights in the same way as incumbent 
government employees? Future research could also explore the social construct of social 
media. For example, as social media continue to proliferate, do people view them as 
becoming more serious and due more protections or less serious and due fewer protections? 
Finally, if enough homeland security agencies publish their SMS policies for applicants, 
future research could review those policies to delineate speech that homeland security 
employers find disqualifying from speech they do not. 
Future legal action can provide judicial resolution of the question of the level of 
speech protections to which applicants are entitled. Although individual applicants may 
find the legal costs associated with such a suit prohibitive, free-speech advocacy groups, 
such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), could take on the litigation costs as 
part of their mission. The ACLU already spends approximately 22 percent of its annual 
budget on legal expenses to fulfill its mission statement of “working tirelessly in courts, 
legislatures, and communities to defend and preserve the Constitution’s promise of 
liberty.”410 If the ACLU or a similar group finds that an applicant was denied employment 
by a homeland security agency because the applicant took a political position on social 
media, the ACLU might sponsor that case to set a precedent for applicants across the 
country.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Homeland security employers must recruit the best talent to fulfill their missions, 
and social media screening provides additional and unique information when engaging in 
background investigations. However, unlike traditional background investigation 
techniques, social media screening includes the possibility that homeland security 
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employers will infringe on the free-speech rights of their applicants. Homeland security 
employers should recognize these rights, acknowledge the risk that social media screening 
may affect these rights, and take steps to minimize the impacts of social media screening 
on these rights.  
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APPENDIX A. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF CASES CITING TO PICKERING V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
AND INCLUDING THE KEYWORD “APPLICANT” 
 Court / Case Related to job applicants? Comment 
    
 U.S. Supreme Court     
1. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 No 
Not free speech related. Petitioner 
attempting to force the state to collect 
union dues and made an argument 
analogizing to Pickering. 
 1st Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
2. Perez v. Zayas, 396 F. Supp. 2d 90 No "Applicant" refers to an applicant for government benefits. 
 2nd Circuit - Court of Appeals     
3. Harman v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 111 No "Applicant" used in a footnote referring to another case. 
 2nd Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
4. Murray v. Town of Stratford, 996 F. Supp. 2d 90 No "Applicant" referred to an applicant for promotion. 
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5. Spence v. Ellis, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146449 No 
Incumbent employee denied an 
endorsement letters as an "applicant" 
for a firearms license. 
6. Savoy of Newburgh, Inc. v. City of Newburgh, 657 F. Supp. 2d 437 No 
"Applicant" referred to an applicant 
seeking to renew a government 
contract, not employment. 
7. Locurto v. Giuliani, 269 F. Supp. 2d 368 No 
"Applicant" referred to an applicant for 
a transfer from one agency to 
another. 
8. Shelton Police Union v. Voccola, 125 F. Supp. 2d 604 No 
"Applicant" referred to an applicant for 
employment, but the plaintiff was 
attempting to publicize the nepotism 
of Chief trying to hire his own son. 
Pickering only applied to incumbent 
employees. 
9. Belch v. Jefferson County, 108 F. Supp. 2d 143 No "Applicant" referred to an applicant for promotion. 
10. Piesco v. New York, Dep't of Personnel, 753 F. Supp. 468 No 
"Applicant" does refer to applicants 
for police officer position, but 
incumbent testing employee/plaintiff 
was terminated for speaking out 
about the passing score for that job. 
11. Haurilak v. Kelley, 425 F. Supp. 626 No "Applicant" referred to an applicant for promotion. 
 3rd Circuit - Court of Appeals     
12. Springer v. Henry, 435 F.3d 268 No 
"Applicant" referred to an employee 





 3rd Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
13. Mitchell v. Miller, 884 F. Supp. 2d 334 No 
"Applicant” was a PA State Trooper 
cadet in training and therefore already 
an employee. 
14. Toth v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 844 F. Supp. 2d 611 No "Applicant" referred to an applicant for promotion. 
15. Yu v. United States Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71995 No 
"Applicant" merely included in a quote 
from the employee handbook; case is 
about an incumbent employee. 
16. Beckinger v. Twp. of Elizabeth, 697 F. Supp. 2d 610 No "Applicant" included in a quote from another case. 
17. Schlarp v. Dern, 610 F. Supp. 2d 450 No "Applicant" referred to an applicant for promotion. 
18. Miller v. Weinstein, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111949 No "Applicant" used in a Free Exercise clause analysis. 
19. Morrison v. City of Reading, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16942 Maybe 
"Applicant" refers to an applicant for a 
volunteer position. Court does engage 
in a Pickering analysis. 
20. Grigsby v. Kane, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2010 No 
"Applicant" refers to an employee 
whose job it was to review applicants 
for a state license. 




 4th Circuit - Court of Appeals     
22. Lawson v. Gault, 828 F.3d 239 No "Applicant" used in summary of another case. 
23. Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766 No 
"Applicant" refers to an employee who 
applied to have his position renewed 
but was demoted. 
24. Jurgensen v. Fairfax County, 745 F.2d 868 No "Applicant" used when quoting the Whistleblower Protection Act. 
 4th Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
25. Durham v. Jones, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128360 No "Applicant" used when discussing applying for attorney's fees. 
26. Howell v. Marion Sch. Dist. One, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22723 No "Applicant" used when discussing employment license applicants. 
 5th Circuit - Court of Appeals     
27. Anderson v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 580 No 
"Applicant" used to describe an 
applicant for transfer to another 
position. 
28. Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337 No 
"Applicant" used in quote from Board 
of Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. 
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, which is a 





29. Kinney v. Weaver, 301 F.3d 253 No 
"Applicant" used in quote from Board 
of Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. 
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, which is a 
case about an incumbent contract 
employee. 
30. Brady v. Fort Bend County, 145 F.3d 691 No "Applicant" used when discussing applying for attorney's fees. 
31. Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251 No "Applicant" referred to an applicant for promotion. 
 5th Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
32. Oller v. Roussel, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117694 No 
"Applicant" referred to an incumbent 
professor applying for a prestigious 
chair. 
33. Jackson v. Tex. Southern Univ., 997 F. Supp. 2d 613 No "Applicant" used in a quote from another case. 
34. De La Garza v. Brumby, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26675 Maybe 
"Applicant" was a sheriff ousted in an 
election who then applied to be a 
school safety officer. Court does 
engage in a Pickering analysis. 
35. Childers v. Dallas Police Dep't, 513 F. Supp. 134 No "Applicant" referred to an applicant for promotion. 
 6th Circuit - Court of Appeals     
36. Miller v. City of Canton, 319 Fed. Appx. 411 No "Applicant" used in a quote from another case. 
37. Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250 No 
"Applicant" was an applying to keep 
his job when the title changed from 
elected to appointed. 
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 6th Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
38. Wolgast v. Tawas Area Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127437 No 
"Applicant" used in state law 
discussion. 
39. Hadad v. Croucher, 970 F. Supp. 1227 No 
"Applicant" used in discussing 
improper application for traffic 
violation data. 
 7th Circuit - Court of Appeals     
40. Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 96 No 
Plaintiff was an "applicant" early in the 
fact history. After was accepted for 
employment, he spoke after speaking 
out publicly and the employer 
rescinded the employment offer. 
41. Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292 No Describing how incumbent employees interview "applicants." 
 7th Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
42. Fagbemi v. City of Chi., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26347 No "Applicant" referred to an applicant for promotion. 
43. Iovinelli v. Pritchett, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52617 No "Applicant" referred to an applicant for promotion. 
44. Thompson v. Board of Education, 711 F. Supp. 394 No "Applicant" refers to an employee applying for a transfer. 
45. Kukla v. Antioch, 647 F. Supp. 799 No  "Applicant" used in a citation to another case. 
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 8th Circuit - Court of Appeals     
46. Bailey v. Dep't of Elem. & Secondary Educ., 451 F.3d 514 No 
Plaintiff's job was to evaluate 
"applicants" for Social Security 
Disability. 
47. Richardson v. Sugg, 448 F.3d 1046 No 
Describing employers discriminating 
against "applicants" in violation of the 
Civil Rights Act, not Pickering. 
 8th Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
48. Hemminghaus v. Missouri, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19293 No 
Describing employers discriminating 
against "applicants" in violation of the 
FMLA, not Pickering. 
49. Minten v. Weber, 832 F. Supp. 2d 1007 No Plaintiff was terminated and denied as an "applicant" for a firearms license. 
50. Campion, Barrow & Assocs. of Illinois, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 652 F. Supp. 2d 986 No 
Subcontractor "applicant" for a new 
contract. 
 9th Circuit - Court of Appeals     
51. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168 No Police officers was an "applicant" for a search warrant. 
52. Voigt v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552 No 
Plaintiff terminated for speaking about 





 9th Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
53. Mitchell-Matthews v. California, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43900 No 
Rehabilitation officer terminated for 
how she treated an "applicant" for 
service. 
54. Dahlia v. City of Burbank, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145241 No "Applicant" refers to another officer's duties to check on job applicants. 
55. Delia v. Benton County, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87435 Maybe Plaintiff conditionally hired and then offer was rescinded.  
 10th Circuit - Court of Appeals     
56. Glover v. Mabrey, 384 Fed. Appx. 763 No 
"Applicant" used in quote from Board 
of Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. 
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, which is a 
case about an incumbent contract 
employee. 
57. Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294 No 
Describing employers discriminating 
against "applicants" in violation of the 
Civil Rights Act, not Pickering. 
58. Considine v. Board of County Comm'rs, 910 F.2d 695 No "Applicant" refers to another officer's duties to check on applicants. 
59. Koch v. Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436 No "Applicant" used in quote from an unrelated case. 
 10th Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
60. Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1219 No "Applicant" referred to application for a school to classified a charter school. 
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61. Sanchez v. City of Altus, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3252 No 
Employees were complaining about 
an English language policy that 
applied to "applicants." 
62. Westbrook v. Teton County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 918 F. Supp. 1475 No 
Uses "applicant" when discussing the 
difference between "prior restraint" 
and "chilling speech" but not related 
to job applicants. 
 11th Circuit - Court of Appeals     
63. McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558 No "Applicant" used in a citation to another case. 
64. Kurtz v. Vickrey, 855 F.2d 723 No "Applicant" referred to an applicant for promotion. 
 11th Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
65. Langford v. Hale Cnty., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115866 No "Applicant" used in a quote from an employee handbook. 
66. Long v. Ala. Dep't of Human Res., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181465 No 
Describing employers discriminating 
against "applicants" in violation of the 
Civil Rights Act, not Pickering. 
67. McShea v. Sch. Bd. of Collier County, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1325 No "Applicant" referred to an applicant for transfer. 
68. VanCamp v. McNesby, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121576 No "Applicant" used in a citation to another case. 
69. Local 491 v. Gwinnett County, 510 F. Supp. 2d 1271 No "Applicant" used in a citation to another case. 
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70. Bevill v. UAB Walker College, 62 F. Supp. 2d 1259 No 
Describing employers discriminating 
against "applicants" in violation of the 
Civil Rights Act, not Pickering. 
 D.C. Circuit - Court of Appeals     
71. Williams v. IRS, 919 F.2d 745 No "Applicant" used in a citation to another case. 
 D.C. Circuit - U.S. District Court     
72. Pearson v. District of Columbia, 644 F. Supp. 2d 23 No "Applicant" was applying for a renewed term as an ALJ. 
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APPENDIX B. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF CASES CITING TO PICKERING V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
AND INCLUDING THE KEYWORD “CANDIDATE” 
 
 Court / Case Related to job applicants? Comment 
    
 U.S. Supreme Court     
1. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
 1st Circuit - Court of Appeals     
2. O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905 No "Candidate" appears in a footnote referencing an unrelated case. 
 1st Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
3. Bruno v. Town of Framingham, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108729 No 
Employee spoke as an employee, 
resigned, and then sought his old job 
back as a "candidate." 




 2nd Circuit - Court of Appeals     
5. Lynch v. Ackley, 811 F.3d 569 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
6. Castine v. Zurlo, 756 F.3d 171 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
7. Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100 No Employee was a "candidate" for tenure. 
8. McEvoy v. Spencer, 124 F.3d 92 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
 2nd Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
9. Lynch v. Ackley, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134274 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
10. Murray v. Town of Stratford, 996 F. Supp. 2d 90 Coverd in Pickering Analysis 
 
11. Pisano v. Mancone, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28864 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
12. Kelly v. Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist., 675 F. Supp. 2d 283 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
13. Savoy of Newburgh, Inc. v. City of Newburgh, 657 F. Supp. 2d 437 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
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14. Sassi v. Lou-Gould, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13643 No "Candidate" referred to an applicant for promotion. 
15. Fillie-Faboe v. Voc. Educ. & Extension Bd., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25381 No  
"Candidate" used in a squib citation to 
another case. 
16. Shelton Police Union v. Voccola, 125 F. Supp. 2d 604 No 
Incumbent employee voiced concerns 
about nepotism of a chief hiring his 
own son, who was a "candidate." 
17. Belch v. Jefferson County, 108 F. Supp. 2d 143 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
18. Harman v. City of New York, 945 F. Supp. 750 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
19. Piesco v. New York, Dep't of Personnel, 753 F. Supp. 468 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
 3rd Circuit - Court of Appeals     
20. Lodge No. 5 of FOP v. City of Philadelphia, 763 F.3d 358 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
21. Curinga v. City of Clairton, 357 F.3d 305 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
22. Azzaro v. County of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968 No "Candidate" appears in a footnote referencing an unrelated case. 
23. Monsanto v. Quinn, 674 F.2d 990 No "Candidate" referred to an applicant for promotion. 
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 3rd Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
24. Brown v. Tucci, 960 F. Supp. 2d 544 No  "Candidate" used in a squib citation to another case. 
25. Kimmett v. Corbett, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57059 No  "Candidate" used in a squib citation to another case. 
26. Mitchell v. Miller, 884 F. Supp. 2d 334 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
27. Toth v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 844 F. Supp. 2d 611 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
28. Kimmett v. Corbett, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157281 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
29. Moore v. Darlington Twp., 690 F. Supp. 2d 378 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
30. Schlarp v. Dern, 610 F. Supp. 2d 450 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
31. Miller v. Weinstein, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111949 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
32. Baranowski v. Waters, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21301 No  "Candidate" used in a squib citation to another case. 
33. Morrison v. City of Reading, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16942 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
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34. Lees v. West Greene School Dist., 632 F. Supp. 1327 No Employee was a "candidate" for tenure. 
35. Gobla v. Crestwood School Dist., 609 F. Supp. 972 No  "Candidate" used in a squib citation to another case. 
 4th Circuit - Court of Appeals     
36. Lawson v. Gault, 828 F.3d 239 No  "Candidate" used in a squib citation to another case. 
37. Smith v. Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
38. Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
39. Kim v. Coppin State College, 662 F.2d 1055 No "Candidate" referred to an applicant for promotion. 
 4th Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
40. Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 106 F. Supp. 3d 744 No "Candidate" referred to an applicant for promotion. 
41. Claridy v. Anderson, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28150 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
42. Bloom v. Bd. of Educ. of Monongalia County, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160195 No 
"Candidate" refers to a political 
candidate. 
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43. Conley v. Town of Elkton, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2602 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
 5th Circuit - Court of Appeals     
44. Communs. Workers of Am. v. Ector County Hosp. Dist., 467 F.3d 427 No  
"Candidate" used in a squib citation to 
another case. 
45. Branton v. City of Dallas, 272 F.3d 730 No  "Candidate" used in a squib citation to another case. 
46. Brady v. Fort Bend County, 145 F.3d 691 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
47. Kinsey v. Salado Indep. Sch. Dist., 916 F.2d 273 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
48. Burris v. Willis Independent School Dist., Inc., 713 F.2d 1087 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
49. Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
 5th Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
50. Hays v. LaForge, 113 F. Supp. 3d 883 No "Candidate" referred to an applicant for promotion. 
51. Papagolos v. Lafayette County Sch. Dist., 972 F. Supp. 2d 912 No  "Candidate" used in a squib citation to another case. 
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52. De La Garza v. Brumby, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26675 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
53. Ricci v. Cleveland Indep. Sch. Dist., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98917 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
54. Childers v. Dallas Police Dep't, 513 F. Supp. 134 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
55. Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
56. Jordan v. Cagle, 474 F. Supp. 1198 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
57. Barbre v. Garland Independent School Dist., 474 F. Supp. 687 No  "Candidate" used in a squib citation to another case. 
 6th Circuit - Court of Appeals     
58. Baar v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 476 Fed. Appx. 621 No 
"Candidate" used in an analysis of 
public employer liability for individual 
action; not Pickering related. 
59. Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 




 6th Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
61. Marsilio v. Vigluicci, 924 F. Supp. 2d 837 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
62. Marsilio v. Vigluicci, 924 F. Supp. 2d 837 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
63. Dye v. Office of Racing Comm'n, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57628 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
64. Spencer v. City of Catlettsburg, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40857 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
65. Hadad v. Croucher, 970 F. Supp. 1227 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
66. Simmons v. Stanton, 502 F. Supp. 932 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
 7th Circuit - Court of Appeals     
67. Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
68. McGreal v. Ostrov, 368 F.3d 657 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
69. Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
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70. Hanneman v. Breier, 528 F.2d 750 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
 7th Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
71. Lalowski v. City of Des Plaines, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149565 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
72. Fagbemi v. City of Chi., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26347 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
73. Iovinelli v. Pritchett, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52617 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
74. Hentea v. Trs. of Purdue Univ., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25599 No "Candidate" refers to a candidate for tenure. 
75. Jobe v. Rager, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1620 No "Candidate" refers to employees job interviewing candidates. 
76. Thompson v. Board of Education, 711 F. Supp. 394 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
77. Kukla v. Antioch, 647 F. Supp. 799 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
 8th Circuit - Court of Appeals     
78. Nord v. Walsh County, 757 F.3d 734 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
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79. Burnham v. Ianni, 98 F.3d 1007 No  "Candidate" used in a squib citation to another case. 
80. Patteson v. Johnson, 721 F.2d 228 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
 8th Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
81. Vincent v. Story County, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184287 No 
"Candidate" used to describe an 
employee’s job description in that she 
interviewed candidates. 
82. Hemminghaus v. Missouri, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19293 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
83. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters Local 2665 v. City of Ferguson, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23869 No 
"Candidate" refers to a political 
candidate. 
84. Day v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 911 F. Supp. 1228 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
85. Goodman v. City of Kansas City, 906 F. Supp. 537 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
86. Lewis v. Harrison Sch. Dist. No. 1, 621 F. Supp. 1480 No "Candidate" refers to candidates for a sports team. 
 9th Circuit - Court of Appeals     
87. Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817 No "Candidate" refers to candidates for promotion. 
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88. Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108 No  "Candidate" used in a squib citation to another case. 
 9th Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
89. Bardzik v. County of Orange, 605 F. Supp. 2d 1076 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
90. Robinson v. County of Los Angeles, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98591 No "Candidate" refers to candidates for promotion. 
91. Delia v. Benton County, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87435 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
92. Fujiwara v. Clark, 477 F. Supp. 822 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
 10th Circuit - Court of Appeals     
93. Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
94. Koch v. Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
 10th Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
95. Eaton v. Harsha, 505 F. Supp. 2d 948 No 
"Candidate" does refer to a candidate 
for employment, but not related to the 
suit where incumbent employees 
were disciplined. 
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96. Lunsford v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67119 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
97. Sedillos v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36816 No 
"Candidate" refers to a political 
candidate. 
98. Busey v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Shawnee, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1095 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
99. Hogan v. City of Independence, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12325 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
100. Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279 No 
"Candidate" was a candidate for 
renewing a contract to coach 
volleyball. 
101. Andersen v. McCotter, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1223 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
102. Ruff v. City of Leavenworth, 854 F. Supp. 774 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
 11th Circuit - Court of Appeals     
103. Alves v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 804 F.3d 1149 No "Candidate" refers to employee’s job description in interviewing candidates. 
104. Gresham v. City of Atlanta, 542 Fed. Appx. 817 No "Candidate" was a candidate for promotion. 
105. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
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106. Stough v. Gallagher, 967 F.2d 1523 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
107. Kurtz v. Vickrey, 855 F.2d 723 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
 11th Circuit - U.S. District Courts     
108. Langford v. Hale Cnty., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115866 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
109. Slane v. City of Sanibel, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93157 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
110. VanCamp v. McNesby, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121576 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
111. Local 491 v. Gwinnett County, 510 F. Supp. 2d 1271 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
112. Harvey v. City of Bradenton, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38095 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
113. Bevill v. UAB Walker College, 62 F. Supp. 2d 1259 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
 D.C. Circuit - Court of Appeals     
114. National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
116 
115. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 830 F.2d 294 No 
"Candidate" was a candidate for 
promotion. 
 D.C. Circuit - U.S. District Court     
116. Davis v. Billington, 775 F. Supp. 2d 23 No  "Candidate" used in a squib citation to another case. 
117. Pearson v. District of Columbia, 644 F. Supp. 2d 23 Covered in Pickering Analysis 
 
118. Dougherty v. Barry, 604 F. Supp. 1424 No "Candidate" was a candidate for promotion. 
119. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 595 F. Supp. 1352 No 
"Candidate" refers to a political 
candidate. 
 Federal Circuit - Court of Appeals     
120. Briggs v. MSPB, 331 F.3d 1307, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 11608 No "Candidate" refers to a political candidate. 
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